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ADMINISTERING ELECTION LAW 
SAUL ZIPKIN* 
In recent years, commentators have expressed heightened concern 
about the harms to democratic legitimacy caused by political actors 
making decisions about the electoral process on partisan or incumbent-
protecting bases.  This concern has been recognized in a number of 
judicial opinions, but has not taken form in election law doctrine.  This 
Article argues that administrative law presents a well-developed doctrinal 
resource for addressing concerns about democratic legitimacy in the 
electoral process.  Administrative law trades off some direct electoral 
control for some demonstrated expertise and shores up the democratic 
element through lines of accountability to the legislature, the executive, 
and the public.  The resulting framework seeks an optimal balance in 
effective democratic governance.  Despite the institutional differences 
between administrative law and election law, both confront the central 
challenge of securing democratic legitimacy in contexts of governance by 
state actors who are shielded from robust accountability mechanisms.  In 
connecting the treatment of democratic values across the administrative 
law and election law settings, reflecting the operation and selection of 
government, I contend that these settings demand similar models of 
governmental decisionmaking.  This approach calls for regulation of 
elections on a standard of instrumental rationality as to the means of 
reaching politically determined and constitutionally valid ends, thereby 
promoting the effective operation of the democratic process.  To illustrate 
this approach, I sketch a framework for adapting administrative law tools 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Democratic ideals shape the legal treatment of state action in 
numerous ways.  Courts accord a presumption of constitutionality to 
statutes enacted by the legislature,1 and a number of doctrines reflect a 
 
1. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (describing, as a 
“presumption of constitutionality,” that “[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate 
branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a 
plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds”). 
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preference for decisions made by the political branches.2  In contrast, 
concerns arise when non-elected actors make decisions for the polity.  
Hesitations about judicial review are familiar,3 as are doubts about the 
legitimacy of actions taken by administrative officials.4  In these settings, 
state actors who are not directly accountable to the public through 
elections are justified as legitimate authorities only in particular settings 
characterized by procedural protections and limitations as to substance. 
The context of elections complicates this framework because the 
usual deference to elected officials clashes with the need to ensure the 
propriety of the process by which those same officials are chosen.  
Deference to political oversight of the electoral process threatens 
circular justification, suggesting that those making decisions about the 
electoral process are democratically accountable via the very election 
procedures being challenged.  In egregious situations, like the severely 
malapportioned state legislatures at issue in the early one person–one 
vote decisions, the federal courts have intervened in the electoral 
process in order to promote accountability.5  However, the courts have 
not settled on what, if anything, to do in settings of less dramatic harm. 
In recent years, commentators and judges have displayed heightened 
concern about political actors making decisions about the electoral 
process on partisan or incumbent-protecting bases, and have called for 
greater policing of this dynamic.6  Such arguments have been advanced 
in a variety of election law contexts, including election administration, 
the redistricting process, campaign finance law, and political party 
regulation, but the concerns they raise have not been well integrated 
into election law doctrine or into the broader framework of 
constitutional law.  As a result, despite awareness of district lines drawn 
to dissuade challengers or to maximize partisan gains, campaign finance 
 
2. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962) (explaining the counter-
majoritarian difficulty). 
4. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (discussing the means of legitimating agency action through 
administrative law). 
5. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545, 586–87 (1964) (striking down a state 
districting scheme with a disparity in population of up to 41-to-1 between districts); cf. 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 680 n.39 (2008) (Stevens J., dissenting) (noting 
that the Court’s involvement in the oversight of legislative districting “was justified because 
the political process was manifestly unable to solve the problem of unequal districts”). 
6. See infra Part II (discussing these arguments). 
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laws that make it difficult to effectively challenge incumbents, election 
administration provisions that constrain the ability of certain voters to 
vote, and ballot access rules that limit the capacity of third parties to 
appear before the voters, election law doctrine has generally allowed for 
these manipulations. 
Though the right to vote might be thought to provide a robust 
vehicle for judicial oversight of the electoral process, challenges to the 
operation of the democratic process often prove difficult to formulate as 
effective rights claims.  As a result, some commentators have advocated 
a structural approach in the election setting, but this model presents its 
own difficulties due to the limited guidance provided by the 
constitutional text regarding the democratic process as well as 
hesitations about a judicial role in choosing among political theories.  
Consequently, despite the explosion of election law litigation since the 
eye-opening events surrounding the 2000 election, and the 
corresponding growth in popular and scholarly interest in these issues, 
the federal courts have not developed a comprehensive account of the 
appropriate judicial treatment of claims addressing the operation of the 
democratic process.  In this Article, I leverage the doctrinal and 
conceptual frameworks of administrative law to advance such an 
account. 
This Article contends that the tools and thinking that courts have 
developed in response to concerns about democratic legitimacy in the 
administrative law setting can provide guidance for the effort to 
confront analogous concerns in election law.  In a context in which 
demands for accountability can collide with the governance needs of the 
modern regulatory state, administrative law doctrine draws an elaborate 
framework presenting multiple tracks of political oversight that are 
balanced against the deployment of expertise-based judgment by agency 
officials.7  Administrative law promotes lines of responsiveness to the 
legislature, the executive, and the people,8 and trades off some electoral 
control for the demonstrated exercise of instrumental knowledge, in 
part through a framework of means-ends reasoning.  This framing of 
 
7. See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a 
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 988 (1997) (arguing that “[n]o single mode of 
democratic legitimation can serve to mediate between the conflicted, protean, often inchoate 
will of the people and the modern regulatory enterprise”). 
8. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2363 (2001) 
(arguing that “most of administrative law is best understood as a set of rules for allocating 
control over agency action to diverse individuals and institutions”). 
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administrative law doctrine reveals a nuanced judicial response to the 
challenge of balancing popular accountability and effective governance. 
Although the election law concerns I discuss here implicate the 
content of substantive law rather than the identity of the lawmaker, as 
administrative law does, the challenge posed by state actors shielded 
from effective accountability mechanisms counsels a similar framework 
of legitimation.  Much as administrative law doctrine seeks to counteract 
any deficit of democracy by demanding that agency officials act on the 
basis of reasoned judgment, I argue that political actors enacting 
election provisions should likewise be held to a standard of instrumental 
rationality as a means of promoting the effective operation of the 
electoral process.9  In doctrinal terms, I propose that courts considering 
election claims evaluate whether the challenged provision reflects a 
reasonable judgment as a means of reaching politically determined and 
constitutionally valid ends. 
In developing this claim, I (1) specify the democratic concerns at 
issue in the election law setting; (2) articulate the mechanisms by which 
courts have approached the problem of democratic legitimacy in the 
administrative law setting, a framework embedded within a broader 
account of constitutional law; (3) explain how the administrative law 
framework is a desirable model in that the democratic concerns to which 
it responds and the forms of judgment it demands are usefully analogous 
to those at issue in the election setting; and (4) sketch specific ways in 
which the administrative law tools might be adapted and applied to the 
election law context, using as examples challenges to voter identification 
provisions and districting claims.  The four Parts of this Article address 
these points in turn. 
Through this discussion, I aim to sharpen the connection between 
the role of democratic values in the operation of government and in the 
selection of government.  Though both administrative law and election 
law are broadly characterized by concerns about democratic legitimacy 
and accountability, the doctrines and scholarly dialogues have thus far 
proceeded largely in parallel, with little overlap.10  In drawing this 
 
9. By “democracy,” I mean to invoke a colloquial and basic account of democratic 
practice, characterized by state action based on popular will as reflected through fair elections 
that broadly allow for both ex ante selection of governing officials and retrospective power to 
remove those officials.  I say more about my account of democracy in Part IV. 
10. For some exceptions, see Heather K. Gerken, Essay, A Third Way for the Voting 
Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 746–48 (2006) 
(examining administrative law frameworks in the election law setting); Note, A Federal 
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account of democracy in operation across governmental settings, I seek 
to build on those who have pointed to connections between the election 
and governing settings11 and to explore the integration of election law 
with a larger account of public law, encompassing the various bodies of 
law that shape the structural operation of the state.12  While scholars 
have demonstrated “why voting is different” and should not casually be 
treated like other rights,13 this Article considers one way in which 
election law presents a component of an integrated body of public law 
shaping an appealing model of democratic governance. 
The recent rise in arguments that decisions regarding the democratic 
process should not be made on a partisan or incumbent-protecting basis, 
and the recurring echo in judicial opinions of this concern, reflect an 
anxiety about the democratic legitimacy of the political struggle over the 
structures that legitimize political decisions.  Given longstanding 
concerns about authority exercised by unelected agency officials, are 
independent districting commissions a good idea?  Should we view the 
districting process as akin to, say, monetary policy, a matter historically 
shielded from political whim but also not subjected to some form of 
heightened judicial review?14  To what extent is the electoral process a 
 
Administrative Approach to Redistricting Reform, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1842, 1843 (2008) 
(advocating creation of a federal agency for review of partisan redistricting claims but 
“providing a safe harbor for states that use independent agencies to redraw district lines”). 
11. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 131–33 (1980) (calling for a more robust nondelegation doctrine and arguing that 
“[t]here can be little point in worrying about the distribution of the franchise and other 
personal political rights unless the important policy choices are being made by elected 
officials”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 1705, 1707–08 (1993) (describing right to vote to include interests in participation, 
aggregation, and governance). 
12. See generally Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179 (2011) (offering 
an account of integration of election law and federal courts doctrine in the justiciability 
context). 
13. Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 
1201, 1202–04 (1996). 
14. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 42 (noting that in domestic administrative 
law schemes, accountability mechanisms may not apply uniformly and that “[e]xceptions, or 
at least lower standards, commonly apply, for instance, to matters of national security and to 
the decisions of central banks”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 622 n.202 (1984) 
(noting that “it has long been argued that the conduct of monetary policy, although not 
carried out using formal procedures, must be free of the suspicion of political influence”); cf. 
Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration 
to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 983–84 (2005) (arguing that for 
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matter of constitutional concern and of heightened judicial skepticism?  
Or do the demands of democracy require that decisions about the 
democratic process be left to the political process?  I suggest here one 
orientation toward these issues, following on the elaborate doctrinal 
model developed in another area of democratic concern. 
II.  ELECTION LAW AND THE CONCERN ABOUT SELF-DEALING 
In recent years, commentators and judges have expressed 
heightened concern about electoral provisions that appear to be 
motivated by “political” interests, designed to promote particular 
outcomes on partisan or incumbent-protecting grounds (or both).15  
Across a number of election law settings, such provisions have been 
challenged on the basis that they compromise the democratic legitimacy 
of the electoral process by distorting that process to achieve a specific 
result.  While these criticisms have mostly not been endorsed in 
doctrine, they have been taken seriously by individual justices and 
judges, and they now reflect a significant focus in election law 
scholarship.   
This Part sets out this concern and its treatment by the federal 
courts.  After describing this dynamic in a number of electoral contexts, 
I explain why an individual rights framework has not succeeded in 
dealing with this concern, and discuss the need for a structural account 
of the democratic process that is consistent with the broader framework 
of constitutional law. 
A.  Democratic Legitimacy Concerns in Election Law 
Across a variety of election law settings, we see a recurring concern 
about manipulation of the electoral process.  This is not a particularly 
unexpected result of a process that leaves the players—or some 
players—to act as the umpires.16  In the winner-take-all setting of 
American elections, the incentives all point in one direction, especially 
to the extent that election law doctrine does not give courts the tools 
 
the election administrator “[t]he desired model is that of Alan Greenspan, not Katherine 
Harris”). 
15. For an influential version of this point, see ELY, supra note 11, at 102–03, calling for 
judicial intervention “only when the ‘market,’ in our case the political market, is 
systematically malfunctioning,” such as when “the ins are choking off the channels of political 
change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.” 
16. See IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 64 (2003). 
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with which to effectively police such practices.  In this Part, I describe 
this dynamic in four prominent settings. 
1. The Districting Process 
The districting process is the election context in which concerns 
about self-dealing are most pronounced.  The basic point is 
straightforward: whoever controls the line-drawing process has the 
power to draw districts they and their cohorts are likely to win, a power 
line-drawers have often been willing to exercise since at least the days of 
Elbridge Gerry.17  Despite its vintage and claims to tradition, numerous 
commentators have criticized and sought to limit this practice, arguing 
that a system in which few incumbents are confronted by meaningful 
challenge18 cannot be said to ensure democratic accountability, a 
fundamental commitment of the democratic process. 
Samuel Issacharoff advances such an argument, contending that 
“[a]llowing partisan actors to control redistricting so as to diminish 
competition runs solidly counter to the core concern of democratic 
accountability,”19 and calling for “blue-ribbon commissions, panels of 
retired judges, and Iowa’s computer-based models”20 as possible 
alternatives to the status quo.  Other observers have likewise advocated 
models for independent districting commissions,21 as well as various 
other doctrinal responses.22  Concerns about self-interested districting 
 
17. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF 
INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 55–56 (2008) (describing the birth of the “gerrymander”); see also Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004) (noting that “[o]ne scholar traces [gerrymanders] back to 
the Colony of Pennsylvania at the beginning of the 18th century”). 
18. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 
253, 256–57 & tbl.1 (2006) (presenting data demonstrating that “congressional elections in the 
wake of the post-2000 redistricting were the least competitive in American history”); Jane S. 
Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology and Political Accountability, 89 B.U. 
L. REV. 641, 646 (2009) (noting that “[e]ven in the 2008 election, only fifty of 435 House seats 
were decided by fewer than ten percentage points, and that number is itself higher than the 
average in most recent elections”). 
19. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
623 (2002). 
20. Id. at 644. 
21. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral 
Reform: An Overview, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425 (2006) (surveying possibilities for the use of 
independent electoral commissions). 
22. See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783, 838–
53 (2005) (elaborating on the constitutional prohibition on “excessive partisanship” in the 
districting process and suggesting decision rules to implement that prohibition); Richard 
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are shared by the public to some extent, as suggested by a recent study 
which concluded that “among the minority of voters with an opinion on 
the question, voters generally favor a redistricting process that requires 
bargaining and is run by disinterested actors.”23 
The Supreme Court has recognized concerns about partisanship in 
the districting process even as it has declined to do much about it.  In 
1986, the Court allowed for a partisan gerrymandering claim, with the 
perhaps-impossible-to-demonstrate standard that the challenged scheme 
“will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the 
political process as a whole.”24  Eighteen years later, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
the Court took back whatever it had given, with a plurality finding a lack 
of judicially manageable standards for identifying a constitutional 
violation.25  Justice Scalia’s opinion indicated that excess partisanship 
was nonetheless constitutionally troublesome, a conclusion apparently 
shared by all the Justices.26  In short, commentators and courts have 
expressed concerns of varying degrees about districting done on a 
partisan basis, while disagreeing about what, if anything, courts can or 
should do about it.27 
2. Election Administration 
While the pathologies of the districting process are the subject of 
longstanding debate, analogous concerns in the area of election 
administration have blossomed in the last decade, owing largely to the 
 
Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 397, 413–18 (2005) (emphasizing the “excessive partisanship” account of the 
problem); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 604–
05 (2007) (arguing that “the central harm of political gerrymandering is what I term 
institutional distortion—political elites’ manipulation of governance institutions or electoral 
structures to distort electoral outcomes in order to produce a particular result”); Michael S. 
Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 668–69 (2006) (calling for a direct democracy solution to concerns 
about redistricting). 
23. Joshua Fougere et al., Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Redistricting, 9 ELECTION 
L.J. 325, 341 (2010). 
24. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986). 
25. 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004). 
26. Id. at 293 (noting Justice Stevens’ argument that “an excessive injection of politics [in 
districting] is unlawful” and responding “[s]o it is and so does our opinion assume”). 
27. Courts have used the one person–one vote doctrine in some instances to enforce 
concerns about partisan line-drawing.  See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 875–80 (3d ed. 2007) 
(discussing Cox v. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.), summarily aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 
(2004), and other cases). 
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debacle revealed in the 2000 presidential election.  Commentators have 
detailed the many problems of election administration in America 
today, and they are fairly dispiriting.28  These distortions have been 
ascribed to practices of local and partisan control of elections.29  The 
partisanship element in particular has been the focus of commentators 
in recent years,30 and it raises the same entrenchment and democratic 
legitimacy concerns as the districting setting.31  Where the Secretary of 
State in charge of administering the election is the campaign chair for 
one of the candidates, one might reasonably question the democratic 
propriety of her decisions.32  A desire for nonpartisan election 
administration is apparently shared by the public as well.33  Reflecting a 
somewhat analogous challenge, commentators have raised concerns 
about the Department of Justice’s preclearance practices under Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act as well, suggesting that some decisions may 
have been made for partisan advantage.34 
But the partisan actions of election officials affiliated with one of the 
competitors may be the low-hanging fruit in this setting.  Because 
election law is made by political actors, such as the state legislature, all 
practices are subject to partisan or incumbent-protecting motivations. 
Some commentators have addressed these concerns, advancing 
proposals for apolitical institutions and regulatory practices that would 
 
28. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION 
SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 1–3, 11–14 (2009) (discussing problems of the 
electoral system). 
29. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 
YALE. L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 127 (2009) [hereinafter Tokaji, The Future] (noting that 
“decentralization and partisanship remain the two dominant characteristics of American 
election administration”). 
30. See Hasen, supra note 14, at 973–91 (calling for non-partisan state election 
administration). 
31. See Michael S. Kang, To Here from Theory in Election Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 787, 
789–90 (2009) (reviewing GERKEN, supra note 28) (“Although entrenchment is understood as 
central to certain concerns, such as partisan gerrymandering, it has not been a prominent 
element of scholarship or jurisprudence about many other election-law concerns, such as 
campaign finance and election administration.” (footnote omitted)). 
32. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein: Conflicts of Interest in Election 
Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421, 431–35 (2010) [hereinafter Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra 
Lowenstein] (discussing problems of conflicts of interest in the context of election 
administration). 
33. See Tokaji, The Future, supra note 29, at 132 (discussing survey results on this point). 
34. See Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 
49 HOW. L.J. 785, 807–19 (2006) (discussing preclearance of the Texas redistricting plan in 
2003 and Georgia voter identification law in 2005). 
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allow for the shoring up of democratic legitimacy in the electoral 
process, encompassing both election administration and districting.35  
Here again, we see some concern about election rules promulgated on 
improper bases, even when not rising to the level of a remediable voting 
rights violation.36 
While judicial doctrine has not embraced partisan self-dealing as a 
basis for striking down election administration practices, expressions of 
concern about this dynamic do appear in the case law.  In Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board, a challenge to an Indiana voter 
identification law, a plurality of the Supreme Court did not view the fact 
that the provision had been enacted on a party-line vote as a basis for 
finding the law unconstitutional.37  While the plurality noted that “[i]t is 
fair to infer that partisan considerations may have played a significant 
role in the decision to enact” the law, it concluded that “if a 
nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those 
justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests 
may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual 
legislators.”38  On the Court’s account of the right to vote, the fact that 
the state could invoke the interest in ballot security was sufficient; even 
so, the fact that it is difficult to imagine the Court taking seriously a 
claim based on a party-line vote or partisan advantage in challenges to 
non-electoral laws highlights the relevance of the issue in this setting. 
This recognition was brought out somewhat more strongly in Judge 
 
35.  See Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New Institutionalism, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1075, 1085–88 (2010) (reviewing GERKEN, supra note 28) (discussing this 
“New Institutionalism” approach); see also GERKEN, supra note 28, at 5 (calling for 
development of “Democracy Index” as “a data-driven, information-forcing device designed 
to generate pressure for reform while helping us make more sensible choices about which 
reforms to pursue”). 
36. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures 
for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 650 (2008) 
(“When one political party uses its position of control over the legislative and executive 
branches of government to enact voting requirements that the other major party regards as a 
ploy to deter its constituents from exercising the franchise, the need for representation-
reinforcing review would seem to have reached its apogee.”).  Professors Issacharoff and 
Pildes have emphasized that individual rights violations in the election setting may likewise 
rest on partisan motivations.  See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: 
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 660–66 (1998) (discussing 
Texas Democrats’ motivations to bar African Americans from voting in the party primaries at 
issue in the White Primary Cases). 
37. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203–04 (2008). 
38. Id. 
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Evans’s dissent to the Seventh Circuit’s Crawford opinion, which begins, 
“Let’s not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a 
not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by 
certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”39  Judge Evans called for 
something like “strict scrutiny light” in response,40 but, beyond asserting 
that the sliding scale scrutiny level framework applicable to the claim 
allows for this move, he did not develop the doctrinal analysis.41  These 
treatments of the voter identification law call for a more developed 
constitutional account of this concern.42 
3. Campaign Finance 
The concern about self-dealing has arisen in the campaign finance 
context as well, often on an incumbent-protecting basis.  Justice Scalia 
has argued that campaign finance limitations serve as a means of 
protecting incumbents against challengers,43 and commentators have 
made this point as well.44  On this account, incumbent politicians know 
they have numerous inherent advantages, and enact campaign finance 
regulations to deny potential challengers the ability to overcome those 
advantages by raising and spending more money.  Inasmuch as the 
advantages of incumbency may include the ability to raise vast funds, 
 
39. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., 
dissenting). 
40. Id. at 954, 956. 
41. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: 
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 325 (2007) (making this point as part 
of a discussion of the failure of lower courts “to develop and apply explicitly intent-informed 
standards of review”). 
42. See Recent Case, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 
2007), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1980, 1984–85 (2007) (analogizing the Crawford case to the 
campaign finance concerns about entrenchment). 
43. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 249–50 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (arguing 
that “any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers 
and incumbents tends to favor incumbents” and that “the present legislation targets for 
prohibition certain categories of campaign speech that are particularly harmful to 
incumbents”). 
44. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 29, 134 & n.455 (2004) (listing sources viewing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
as “little more than an incumbent-protection scheme”); Peter J. Wallison & Joel M. Gora, 
Burying the Incumbent Protection Racket, THE AMERICAN (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.american.com/archive/2010/june-2010/burying-the-incumbent-protection-racket; 
cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 62 (noting that bipartisan institutions like the Federal Election 
Commission “have incentives to behave as a duopoly, exempting themselves from the law and 
undermining political competition”). 
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the empirical underpinnings of this argument might be questioned.  
Nonetheless, this argument reflects the same concerns as those 
advanced in the districting and election administration settings, that 
political actors manipulate the regulations of the electoral process to 
favor certain outcomes. 
Justice Breyer, who has generally been sympathetic to campaign 
finance measures, has raised this point as well.  Concurring in a decision 
upholding strict contribution limits in 2000, he noted that the Court 
“should not defer in respect to whether [the legislature’s] solution, by 
imposing too low a contribution limit, significantly increases the 
reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and 
thereby insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge.”45  This 
concern was dispositive a few years later, in a decision striking down 
Vermont’s contribution limits as too low, because “contribution limits 
that are too low can also harm the electoral process by preventing 
challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent 
officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.”46  This 
explicit protection of the competitive process reveals an underlying 
account of election law as necessary to ensure the democratic 
accountability that elections are designed to guarantee. 
4. Political Parties 
The law governing political parties, and especially the question of 
ballot access restrictions that affect the ability of third parties to get on 
the ballot, reflects these concerns as well.  For example, in dissenting 
from a decision upholding a state law banning “fusion”47 candidacies, 
Justice Stevens indicated that “[t]he fact that the law was both intended 
to disadvantage minor parties and has had that effect is a matter that 
should weigh against, rather than in favor of, its constitutionality.”48  
Similarly, in a case brought by a third party that wanted to allow 
participation in its primary by members of other parties,49 Justice 
 
45. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
46. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248–49 (2006). 
47. “‘Fusion,’ also called ‘cross-filing’ or ‘multiple-party nomination,’ is ‘the electoral 
support of a single set of candidates by two or more parties.’”  Timmons v. Twin Cities Area 
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353 n.1 (1997) (quoting Peter H. Argersinger, “A Place on the 
Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287, 288 (1980)). 
48. Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
49. “In a semi-closed primary, independent and non-affiliated voters are permitted to 
participate in the primaries, but not members of the opposing party.”  ISSACHAROFF ET AL., 
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O’Connor observed that 
 
[a]lthough the State has a legitimate—and indeed critical—role 
to play in regulating elections, it must be recognized that it is not 
a wholly independent or neutral arbiter.  Rather, the State is 
itself controlled by the political party or parties in power, which 
presumably have an incentive to shape the rules of the electoral 
game to their own benefit.50 
 
Much like the Crawford plurality, Justice O’Connor concluded that 
skeptical review was nonetheless only required when the challenged 
restrictions are severe “and particularly where they have discriminatory 
effects,”51 highlighting the disconnect between the concern and the 
doctrine.  Commentators have likewise criticized the Court’s protection 
of the two-party system and approval of ballot access restrictions for 
third parties.52 
Yet another setting in which this concern has come up is access for 
candidates within a party to the primary ballot.  Nathaniel Persily has 
explored the obstacles impeding John McCain’s ability to get on the 
ballot for the 2000 Republican primary in New York, and described the 
“common sense approach” of the court considering the challenge to 
those rules, asking: “If Senator John McCain—a candidate who agreed 
to accept federal matching funds and spending limits, the main 
challenger to Governor Bush, a leader in the polls in several states, and 
the victor in the New Hampshire primary—could not get on the ballot, 
then how could the laws possibly be constitutional?”53  Professor 
Persily’s paraphrase of the Court’s question—“Why have a primary at 
all if the practical barriers to candidate entry can only be surmounted by 
the nominee already backed by the party establishment?”54—reflects the 
larger issue in these cases. 
 
supra note 27, at 283. 
50. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
51. Id. 
52. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political 
Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 332–33 (1997); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 36, at 
674–90. 
53. Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary 
Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2205 (2001). 
54. Id. 
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5. Other Election Law Settings 
These concerns have taken two related forms as well.  One theme 
has been the appearance of judicial discomfort, not with specifically 
partisan or incumbent-protecting actions, but with politics more 
generally.55  Bush v. Gore56 provides a striking example of this dynamic; 
in a setting whose mechanisms are provided for by law,57 the Court 
intervened to resolve the situation without letting the specified 
procedures for decision by Congress occur.58  While some commentators 
praised the Court for avoiding the chaos that this process might yield,59 
others criticized the plurality on this ground.60  What is interesting here 
is not whether the Court was right or wrong; rather, the instinctual 
concern—not explained in the Court’s per curiam opinion—that leaving 
the matter to the political process would somehow be harmful is 
consistent both with the recurring sense that politically based 
decisionmaking is troubling in this setting and with the inability or 
refusal to formally incorporate these concerns into the doctrine. 
This dynamic also connects to a growing concern that judicial 
treatment of election law claims can likewise be infected by partisanship 
and harm democratic legitimacy.  Empirical studies suggest that courts 
may be influenced by ideological considerations when deciding Voting 
Rights Act claims,61 presenting a challenge to the hope of judicial 
salvation from the pathologies of political decisions about elections.  
Commentators have raised the concern that judicial intervention in 
election disputes threatens harm to democratic legitimacy based on the 
 
55. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 716 (2001) 
(developing this argument). 
56. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
57. See id. at 153–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “the Twelfth Amendment 
commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count electoral votes”). 
58. See id. at 111 (per curiam) (rejecting Justice Breyer’s argument and stating that 
“[w]hen contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our 
unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has 
been forced to confront”). 
59. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 4 (2001) (arguing that Bush v. Gore “averted what might 
well have been (though the Pollyannas deny this) a political and constitutional crisis”). 
60. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 650–53 (2001) 
(contending that the judiciary was not the proper entity to make this decision). 
61. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2008) (concluding that “judicial ideology significantly influences judicial 
decisionmaking in Voting Rights Act cases”). 
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threat of perception of partisan bias,62 and have, for example, called for 
the formation of special election courts to resolve disputed elections.63  
As this discussion suggests, every element and each stage of the process 
of determining the rules that govern elections have been subject to 
anxieties about the democratic legitimacy of the electoral process. 
The common thread across these accounts is the sense that the 
operation of the democratic process has been unfairly distorted.  To the 
extent the electoral process necessarily rests on a foundation of 
democratic values, these arguments assert that election provisions made 
on self-dealing bases undermine those values.  Supreme Court decisions 
in an array of election law settings corroborate this concern, even if not 
framed on this account; this Article seeks to situate these concerns as an 
account consistent with public law more broadly. 
B.  Rights and Structural Claims in the Election Context 
Inasmuch as these election issues implicate the fundamental right to 
vote, a right the Supreme Court has indicated is “preservative of all 
rights,”64 the instinct might be to respond to these concerns through the 
medium of rights claims, much as concerns about the operation of 
criminal law have largely been developed through litigation invoking the 
procedural protections found in the Bill of Rights.65  Yet this approach 
has not effectively addressed the problem, as election claims often do 
not work well when framed as individual rights claims, for a variety of 
practical and conceptual reasons.  We should then consider how a 
framework of constitutional law could address these concerns about 
democratic legitimacy on a structural approach. 
The doctrine implementing the right to vote relies on a sliding-scale 
model of scrutiny, under which non-severe burdens incur a minimal 
 
62. See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 36, at 645–50 (discussing this concern as presented in 
voter participation cases). 
63. See Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, 
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 376–79 (2007) (arguing for “specialized 
election courts to handle election contests”). 
64. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
65. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3–7 (1996) (detailing ways constitutional law protects only 
criminal procedure and not substantive criminal law).  The individual rights model has been 
criticized in criminal law settings as well.  See, e.g., Eva Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision 
of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (arguing that “the federal habeas system is 
broken largely because of its resolute focus on individual petitioners” and calling for 
structural approach). 
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level of scrutiny and are likely to be upheld, whereas demonstrations of 
heightened burdens trigger heightened review.66  This framework, 
recently confirmed in Crawford, demands that plaintiffs provide 
evidence of a serious burden before the state is put to its evidence.67  
Where plaintiffs are unable to do so, as in Crawford, the state’s simple 
invocation of an interest in election security is usually sufficient to deny 
the constitutional claim.68 
A number of practical hurdles impede the treatment of election 
administration claims on an individual rights model.  These hurdles, 
exacerbated by the disfavor with which the Court has recently treated 
facial claims in this setting,69 include the lack of reliable data resulting 
from the pre-election nature of many of these claims and the limited 
ability of the individuals who would be harmed by these provisions to 
bring suit ex ante,70 as well as any distortions stemming from the focus 
on the specific circumstances of particular individuals.71  While 
districting claims present fewer practical hurdles, they pose conceptual 
difficulties that are similarly problematic because these aggregate claims 
are largely inexplicable on an individual rights account.72 
In light of these and similar points, a number of scholars have argued 
that election claims are often not amenable to being framed as a 
question of rights and have called for a structural account, in which 
courts would protect the electoral process as well as individual rights.73  
 
66. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).  See generally Elmendorf, supra 
note 41 (providing comprehensive analysis of the Burdick model prior to the Crawford 
decision). 
67. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–91 (2008). 
68. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (indicating that “[w]hen a state election law provision 
imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally 
sufficient to justify’ the restrictions” (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 
(1983))). 
69. See Zipkin, supra note 12, at 216–23. 
70. See id. at 219–20. 
71. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1373–74 (N.D. Ga. 2007) 
(denying standing to individual plaintiffs on basis of evidence about the availability of rides 
from their children or of taking a bus to the registrar’s office). 
72. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1663, 1666 (2001) (explaining that, because they implicate an aggregate right, “[v]ote 
dilution claims implicate a special kind of injury, one that does not fit easily with a 
conventional view of individual rights”). 
73. See Elmendorf, supra note 36, at 653 (arguing that “[w]hatever may be the best 
understanding of the right to vote as a matter of first principles, a structural approach is the 
most plausible way to avoid quagmire and resulting injury to the courts’ reputation for 
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This call for a structural rather than individual rights framing of election 
claims has been the subject of some debate in election law scholarship 
but has not been developed in the doctrine.74 
It is worth distinguishing two elements of the structural account of 
election law that are easily conflated.  The first is the argument that an 
individual rights approach is inappropriate or insufficient in the election 
law setting, and that courts should assess these claims with reference to 
a structural model instead.  This argument is distinct from, and prior to, 
a second claim that specifies the particular structural account that courts 
should employ, for example, the claim associated with Professors 
Issacharoff and Pildes that courts should seek to ensure protection of a 
competitive electoral process.75  The criticism that courts should not 
select any particular structural account to serve as a constitutional 
standard brings these two points together.76  The basic question here is 
 
reasoned, impartial decision-making”); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The 
Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 504 (2004) 
(arguing that “[t]he Court has long tried to use a conventional individual-rights framework—
the bread-and-butter of legal analysis—to adjudicate what are often claims about the 
structure of the political process” but that “[a]n individual-rights framework . . . does not 
provide adequate analytic tools for resolving such challenges”); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra 
note 36, at 717 (arguing that “the crucial issues are not so much ones of individual rights of 
participation as ones of the preservation of the robustly competitive partisan environment”); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 80, 81 (2009) (contending that “Caperton continues the Court’s problematic 
insistence on addressing structural problems through the lens of protecting individual 
rights”); Pildes, supra note 44, at 40–41 (arguing that “understandings of individual rights, 
associational rights, and conceptions of equality must be modified to develop an appropriate 
constitutional framework for the increasingly important task of judicial oversight of 
democratic politics”). 
74. See Charles, supra note 22, at 622–25 (discussing disagreements between individual 
rights and structural accounts). 
75. Issacharoff, supra note 19, at 600 (arguing that “the risk in gerrymandering is not so 
much that of discrimination or lack of a formal ability to participate individually, but that of 
constriction of the competitive processes by which voters can express choice”); Richard H. 
Pildes, Commentary, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1606–07 
(1999); see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 
(1942) (defining “the democratic method” as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote”). 
76. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: 
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 152–53 (2003) (emphasizing, 
in response to Issacharoff’s structural argument, concern “about the belief that the Court not 
only can and should make deeply contested normative judgments about the appropriate 
functioning of the political process but also come down on one side of an empirical debate 
without really taking a serious look at the evidence”); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme 
Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME 
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whether disagreement about the content of structural protection of the 
democratic process should be treated differently than disagreements 
about the content of rights within the democratic process77 or the 
content of other structural models, such as federalism or separation of 
powers, which also demand that the courts identify contested theoretical 
commitments to enforce as constitutional law.  Following the belief that 
courts can enforce structural election models as well as they do 
individual voting rights, I focus here on how the electoral process might 
be protected as a structural matter. 
Ensuring electoral competition is not the only structural ideal that 
courts could vindicate in the democratic process.  Alternatives might 
include ideals of proper representation,78 avoiding entrenchment,79 
ensuring non-domination,80 or opportunity for deliberation.  These 
models may well overlap and any would require a fair bit of elaboration.  
I argue for protection of democratic legitimacy in a sense specified 
below,81 and for now address the challenge that confronts all of these 
accounts: Where in the Constitution does any of this come from?82 
In response to this point, Professor Issacharoff acknowledges “that 
the search for a textual justification was unlikely to be fruitful” but 
 
COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 283, 297–302 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002) 
(arguing against structural theories and indicating that “[t]he Supreme Court should not 
select a political theory and impose it on the nation any more than it should impose an 
economic theory”); cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901–02 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“The matters the Court has set out to resolve in vote dilution cases are 
questions of political philosophy, not questions of law.  As such, they are not readily 
subjected to any judicially manageable standards that can guide courts in attempting to select 
between competing theories.” (footnote omitted)). 
77. See Charles, supra note 22, at 653 (making a similar point). 
78. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
1051, 1055, 1076–95 (2010) (proposing an “effective accountability canon” as a canon of 
construction rather than an enforceable constitutional requirement, which would promote the 
constitutional principle that “electoral systems should render elected bodies responsive to the 
interests and concerns of the normative electorate”). 
79. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 497–501 (1997) (arguing for anti-entrenchment approach). 
80. See SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 51–52; Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model 
and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1416–19 (2008). 
81. See infra Part III.B. 
82. See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for 
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 652 
(2002) (“Most would criticize Issacharoff’s argument, as well as the political markets 
approach more generally, on the grounds that it is completely disconnected from the text of 
the Constitution.”). 
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argues that “[t]here is no narrow textual justification for almost any of 
the body of law governing the political process.”83  He elaborates: 
 
It is difficult to see the gain from making believe that the need to 
fill in the gaps in an aging Constitution is anything other than a 
response to our experience with democratic governance.  There 
is certainly no gain in pretending that the answers to the 
questions of how to make democracy work are compelled by 
vague terms such as “due process,” “equal protection,” or 
“republican form of government.”  The same theoretical work 
would have to be done to make concrete the democratic values 
to be read into these open-textured clauses.84 
 
My claim here is that this theoretical work should be incorporated 
into a larger account of American constitutional law.  The remainder of 
this Article will engage that task in advancing administrative law as a 
model for the way ideals of democratic legitimacy might be translated 
into a doctrinal response to concerns about self-dealing in the crafting of 
election provisions as a means of protecting the electoral process itself. 
III.  DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
As numerous observers have explained, a central project of 
administrative law—perhaps the central project—is the effort to cabin 
the discretion of administrative officials.85  In this Part, I examine how 
this commitment takes form in a model of promoting the democratic 
accountability of agencies through multiple overlapping ties to 
democratic actors and trading off some democratic accountability for 
some instrumental expertise.  I first describe the general framework of 
legal justification in public law as premised on deference to elected 
actors unless the challenged action is one not permitted to the political 
process because it implicates a right.  Where an actor not subject to 
democratic accountability mechanisms takes action, the usual 
presumptions about democratic legitimacy may not apply, and 
alternative forms of justification are required.  As a body of law 
addressing the powers given entities not bearing the basic presumption 
 
83. Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 687 (2002). 
84. Id. at 688. 
85. For the canonical treatment of this issue, see Stewart, supra note 4. 
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of democratic legitimacy, administrative law encompasses a variety of 
doctrines designed to compensate for the lack of direct democratic 
accountability in shaping a framework of instrumental justification. 
I sketch a broad account of legal legitimation in public law in Part 
III.A, and explain that the democratic accountability of the legislature 
generally justifies state action but that when the action is presumptively 
improper—whether it infringes on rights or was taken by the “wrong” 
actor—the government is subject to heightened requirements of 
justification.  In Part III.B, I turn to administrative law and canvass an 
array of doctrines to demonstrate that the thrust of the law in this area is 
to funnel political decisions to democratically accountable actors and to 
ensure that instrumental decisions are made on the basis of 
demonstrable evidence that furthers the ends specified by those actors.  
I argue that the use of instrumental rationality serves alongside 
democratic accountability as a justificatory resource in this setting. 
A.  Legal Legitimation in Public Law 
The problem of state action is not a new one.  Thinkers have long 
grappled with the question of how limitations on individual liberty can 
be justified, and have largely embraced consent as a basis of legitimacy,86 
nowadays largely instantiated through democratic procedures.  Here, I 
consider the ways in which state action is validated in constitutional law, 
a setting in which the terms of legal legitimacy turn partly on underlying 
ideals of moral legitimacy,87 with those ideals often taking the form of 
commitments to democratic values.88  My aim is not to confront deeper 
questions about the ultimate legitimacy of the state, but to identify ways 
 
86. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR 
THE MODERN STATE 144–60 (2005) (discussing and criticizing this account of legitimacy and 
observing that “[s]ocial contract theories are the dominant account of political legitimacy in 
modern Western thought”); Stewart, supra note 4, at 1672 (“The doctrine against delegation 
appears ultimately to be bottomed on contractarian political theory running back to Hobbes 
and Locke, under which consent is the only legitimate basis for the exercise of the coercive 
power of government.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis 
of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow 
immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority.”). 
87. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 
1794–1802 (2005) (discussing ideas of legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy). 
88. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality 
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 61–65 (1993) (arguing that, in constitutional 
law, democracy “began to be considered a foundational concept around 1940” as a means of 
justifying both restraints on and exercises of judicial power). 
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in which beliefs about the values that conduce to that legitimacy 
(focusing on democratic values) shape judicial practice in various 
constitutional settings. 
The democratic pedigree of the legislature plays a prominent 
legitimating role in public law.  The broad deference given the 
legislature upon judicial review of statutes not implicating constitutional 
rights reflects the strong presumption of legitimacy accorded the 
democratic process.89  Debates over statutory interpretation turn largely 
on the best way of properly deferring to the democratic process.90  The 
denial of procedural due process rights in the legislation context 
provides a further example of such deference,91 as does the provision in 
standing doctrine that generalized grievances are to be left to the 
political branches.92  In these settings, the democratic process is treated 
as the source of presumptive legitimacy of state action and the basis for 
denying judicial review, unless the litigant provides a basis for rebutting 
that presumption. 
How is the presumption of legitimacy rebutted?  Constitutional 
challenges take two broad forms: either the particular action is 
substantively improper, or a particular state actor cannot take that 
action.  The distinction is between (1) you can’t do that and (2) you can’t 
do that, with the first reflecting the domain of constitutional rights, 
while the second addresses issues of structural constitutional law such as 
 
89. See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, 
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (2010) 
(“The Court recognizes that ours is a democratic government and that elected officials 
answerable to ‘the people’ should make controversial policy decisions, rather than unelected 
judges.”). 
90. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in 
statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. . . .  The judicial task is 
to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.”  (footnote 
omitted)). 
91. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) 
(“General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of 
individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard.  Their 
rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, 
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.”). 
92. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (holding that “a 
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government . . . does not state an 
Article III case or controversy”); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) 
(concluding that “the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives 
support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, 
and ultimately to the political process”). 
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federalism and separation of powers as well as doctrines of 
administrative law. 
1. You Can’t Do That: Rights Violations 
Rights can be seen to structure the relationship of the individual and 
the state, and the contested scope of constitutional rights reflects the 
contested boundaries of state power in various settings.  When a right 
protected by the First or Fourteenth Amendment is infringed,93 courts 
engage in heightened scrutiny of the state action, taking either a strict 
form, which tends to result in invalidation,94 or an intermediate form, 
which resembles a model of balancing.95  Both forms of scrutiny are 
comprised of three elements: an assessment of the validity of the 
legislative end; an evaluation of the fit of the means of reaching that 
end; and the second-order specification of a level of deference under 
which the assessment of means and ends will be conducted.96  The 
challenged action is thus weighed in two dimensions—as a means of 
accomplishing a valid end and as a burden on a protected right—and the 
usual deference to the democratic process either does not apply at all or 
applies less strongly.  In short, once the right is seen to be of a kind that 
incurs some heightened level of protection, the government is called 
upon to justify the infringement as an effective means of achieving some 
valid end.97 
 
93. Other constitutional rights incur different forms of scrutiny.  See District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) (shaping a somewhat categorical model for 
the Second Amendment); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second 
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 404–11 (2009) (discussing and criticizing 
Heller’s categoricalism approach); Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental 
Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 229–32 (2006) (noting different standards of review for 
various Bill of Rights guarantees). 
94. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 
(2007) (discussing development and application of strict scrutiny inquiry). 
95. See Blocher, supra note 93, at 392. 
96. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010) (describing the 
intermediate scrutiny model, “under which a ‘content-neutral regulation will be sustained 
under the First Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the 
suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to 
further those interests’” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997))); 
Fallon, supra note 94, at 1273 (“In modern constitutional law, the term ‘strict scrutiny’ refers 
to a test under which statutes will be pronounced unconstitutional unless they are ‘necessary’ 
or ‘narrowly tailored’ to serve a ‘compelling governmental interest.’”). 
97. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 441 (6th ed. 2009) (“The 
modern Supreme Court’s treatment of equal protection claims has used a means-ends 
methodology in which judges ask whether the classification the government is using is 
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The departure from the usual democratic deference in the rights 
setting can be seen as either external or internal to a democratic 
account.  On one hand, we might believe that some individual interests 
are simply not subject to majority rule because of commitments to 
fundamental liberties or basic human equality or the demands of 
justice.98  Criminal procedure, due process, or equal protection rights can 
be seen to be of this sort, reflecting an ideal that certain basic guarantees 
must be protected against the government, no matter how proper the 
process by which the decision was made.99  On this account, certain 
individual rights are not subject to the political process due to overriding 
value commitments, and the state’s democratic legitimacy, however 
impeccable, cannot suffice to justify their infringement. 
A second approach views some constitutional rights to be necessary 
for the democratic process itself.  Free speech rights have been defended 
on this basis, as crucial for the public discussion that allows democracy 
to operate properly.100  Equal protection or other rights may present 
similar baselines for democratic action,101 and others have argued that 
the Bill of Rights more generally reflects this model as well.102  Here, 
 
sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing.”); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 20–24 (1972) (developing account of equal protection review focused on the state’s 
choice of means to legislatively determined end). 
98. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi, 184–205 (1977) 
(developing an account of rights as “political trumps held by individuals”); Richard H. Pildes, 
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 725, 727–29 (1998) (describing and criticizing this view and noting that “[t]he 
view of rights as immunities for fundamental attributes of the person is also the prevailing 
view among rights philosophers”). 
99. See Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
309, 311 (2000) (noting that in “the immunities view, rights emanate from some conception of 
the self; rights demarcate spheres of belief and conduct insulated from majoritarian 
preferences to enable fundamental attributes of that self to develop”). 
100. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 22–27 (1948). 
101. See Horwitz, supra note 88, at 64 (arguing that “the Warren Court majority 
believed that Brown [v. Board of Education] was a precondition for, and fulfillment of, 
democratic ideals” and that “[f]or the Warren Court majority, some degree of social 
inclusiveness was a necessary precondition for a well-functioning democracy”); Frank 
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1534–35 (1988) (“Just as property rights—
rights of having and holding material resources—become, in a republican perspective, a 
matter of constitutive political concern as underpinning the independence and authenticity of 
the citizen’s contribution to the collective determinations of public life, so is it with the 
privacies of personal refuge and intimacy.”  (footnote omitted)). 
102. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
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viewing the invocation of rights to deny the usual deference to the 
legislature reflects a view that a democratic process denying these rights 
is not a properly operating democratic process and thus not deserving of 
democratic deference.  As this suggests, the invocation of rights claims 
allows the presumption of validity to be rebutted either by showing that 
democratic legitimacy is non-dispositive in light of the constraints 
imposed by other values or that the rights violation itself demonstrates 
that the political process is democratically flawed.103 
Of course, judicial deference is not absolute even outside these 
rights contexts, and legislation must also meet minimal requirements of 
basic rationality, a standard that appears to have its sharpest bite in 
cases of animus.104  This requirement confirms that deference to 
democracy only goes so far.  In sum, democratic accountability serves as 
a presumptively sufficient legitimating resource, a presumption 
superseded or rebutted by claimed violations of rights.  And, where that 
presumption is overcome, courts evaluate state action on metrics of both 
means and ends. 
2. You Can’t Do That: Structural Claims 
Claims that the “wrong” governmental actor was responsible for the 
challenged action arise in settings of structural constitutional law, such 
as separation of powers or federalism contexts, as well as in 
administrative law.  This issue of the wrong actor making decisions 
presents a concern about a “democratic deficit,” the idea that power is 
being exercised outside of settings subject to democratic control.105  In a 
 
1132 (1991) (arguing that “[t]he main thrust of the Bill was not to downplay organizational 
structure, but to deploy it; not to impede popular majorities, but to empower them”). 
103. These competing accounts of rights speak to varying political theory accounts as 
well.  For example, Corey Brettschneider notes that “[t]he view that a theory of basic rights 
both has a root distinct from democracy and also constrains democracy is present in major 
historical and contemporary accounts of liberalism” and opposes this view in “recast[ing] the 
idea of substantive rights as an aspect of the democratic ideal.”  COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, 
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 8–9 (2007). 
104. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50 (1985). 
105. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislation that Isn’t—Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy 
Deficit,” 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1351, 1351–54 (2010); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy 
and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European 
Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 633 (1999) (noting that “[t]here is, one might say, a 
basic ‘democratic deficit’ (to use a phrase that has gained wide currency in Europe) common 
to both” delegation to administrative agencies and supranational institutions). 
10-ZIPKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:06 PM 
666 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:641 
number of settings, including judicial review,106 administrative action,107 
the use of international or foreign law in American courts,108 and 
privatization of governmental functions,109 unelected actors exercise (or 
are thought to exercise) forms of governance, giving rise to concerns 
about democratic legitimacy.110  The wrong actor concern can also arise 
across elected settings, questioning whether the state or federal 
government may take a particular action or whether Congress or the 
President may do so.  Such questions often involve relative assessments 
of democratic accountability as well as the proper execution of 
government powers.111  Here too, ideals of accountability and democratic 
legitimacy can play a role in the treatment of difficult cases. 
Consider contexts involving elected actors.  Viewing the 
Constitution as establishing a government of divided and enumerated 
 
106. See infra text accompanying notes 116–120. 
107. See infra Part III.B. 
108. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 527, 529 (2003) (arguing that “because supranational lawmaking operates outside 
[the constitutional] systems of checks and balances and accountability, it risks undermining 
our Constitution’s institutional strategy”); cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Framers would, I 
am confident, be appalled by the proposition that, for example, the American peoples’ 
democratic adoption of the death penalty, could be judicially nullified because of the 
disapproving views of foreigners.” (citation omitted)). 
109. See generally Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, 
Introduction to GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 1 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (discussing questions 
surrounding “the compatibility of the American outsourcing regime with the country’s 
professed commitment to the democratic values of public participation, accountability, 
transparency, and rule of law”). 
110. Scholars have compared concerns about judicial review to those about 
administrative law on this basis.  See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 464–65 
(2003) (analogizing shift in administrative law to preoccupation with the “countermajoritarian 
difficulty” in constitutional law); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the 
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 540–41, 547–50 (1998) (relating concerns about judicial 
review to concerns about independent agencies); Matthew D. Adler, Justification, Legitimacy, 
and Administrative Governance, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 3, at 1 & n.3, 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1060&context=ils (noting that “Bickel 
and Stewart attack the same general question: How to legitimate non-legislative governance,” 
and crediting the insight to Professor Bressman (footnote omitted)). 
111. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (“The Constitution thus 
contemplates that a State’s government will represent and remain accountable to its own 
citizens.”).  See generally V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 835 (2004) (developing account of structural constitutional claims, like separation of 
powers and federalism, based on representational bases rather than formal or functional 
assessment of powers). 
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powers, the Court has often treated actions taken by actors to whom the 
relevant power was not given as not merely presumptively improper, but 
as categorically invalid.  In separation of powers contexts, the Court 
struck down the legislative veto and the line-item veto without allowing 
the government to demonstrate that these democratically enacted 
schemes were effective means of achieving compelling state interests,112 
as the government potentially could if the infringement were of a 
right.113  Indeed, in some instances the Court explicitly rejected 
functional defenses of the challenged framework.114  The Court has 
likewise found legislation unconstitutional on the basis that it 
commandeered state legislatures or executive officials, thereby 
contravening the federal system, without allowing instrumental 
justification.115  In these cases, actions taken by actors not given the 
relevant power by the Constitution were not given much deference, 
despite the apparent desire of contemporary political actors to reshuffle 
the allocation of powers. 
In contexts where the state actor taking the relevant action is not 
one with direct electoral accountability and thus putatively facing a 
democratic deficit, courts have developed various models of 
justification.  The question of judicial review of legislative action has 
famously raised this issue.116  The intuition is simple: when non-elected 
 
112. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447–48 (1998); Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
113. At other times, the Court has used a balancing model in this setting.  See, e.g., 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (noting that “the real question is whether the 
removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform 
his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that 
light”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (focusing inquiry “on the 
extent to which [the challenged act] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its 
constitutionally assigned functions” and concluding that “[o]nly where the potential for 
disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding 
need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress”). 
114. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (“No one can doubt that Congress 
and the President are confronted with fiscal and economic problems of unprecedented 
magnitude, but ‘the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in 
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution.’” (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944)). 
115. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see also Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of 
Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 200 (noting that in Printz, “[t]he Court announced a 
categorical anti-commandeering rule, one not subject to any case-by-case balancing of 
interests or measurement of burden”). 
116. See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 16 (developing the concept of countermajoritarian 
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judicial actors strike down decisions enacted by elected representatives, 
the polity suffers a democratic harm.117  Multiple responses to this 
concern have been advanced, which roughly track the reasons for 
protections of individual rights and structural provisions more generally: 
that judicial review in practice is not actually countermajoritarian,118 that 
judicial review is democracy-promoting because it supports democratic 
commitments,119 and that in protecting rights, judicial review protects 
crucial values in addition to democracy.120  These accounts legitimate 
judicial review as consistent with democratic values or, alternatively, as 
following from external values that can trump democracy in particular 
settings.  In the next Part, I examine the structure of analysis used in 
administrative law doctrine, a setting which poses its own challenges to 
democratic commitments. 
B.  The Administrative Law Model 
Against this backdrop, I turn to administrative law to assess how 
these democratic concerns play out in this setting.  In this Part, I discuss 
a variety of legal doctrines that shape a response to the lack of 
presumptive democratic legitimacy of agency action.121  To summarize 
 
difficulty); see also Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right to Resist, 97 GEO. L.J. 61, 65 
(2008) (“The countermajoritarian difficulty is probably the dominant theme in contemporary 
legal scholarship about judicial review.”). 
117. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 
1346, 1353 (2006) (“By privileging majority voting among a small number of unelected and 
unaccountable judges, [judicial review] disenfranchises ordinary citizens and brushes aside 
cherished principles of representation and political equality in the final resolution of issues 
about rights.”); see also BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 103, at 142 (criticizing substantive 
accounts for “fail[ing] to recognize that there is a loss to democracy every time a 
nonmajoritarian institution is needed to protect substantive democratic rights”). 
118. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 14 (2009) (arguing that “over time, as Americans have the opportunity to 
think through constitutional issues, Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the 
considered judgment of the American people”). 
119. See, e.g., BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 103, at 136–59 (developing an argument 
that judicial review is sometimes justified as a means of protecting democratic rights); ELY, 
supra note 11, at 73–104 (arguing that judicial review can reinforce representation). 
120. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 116, at 105–06 (arguing that judicial review serves as a 
means of holding government subject to higher law). 
121. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the 
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1336 (2008) (“The overriding purpose behind 
almost every doctrine in administrative law is to control the exercise of agency discretion.”); 
Bressman, supra note 110, at 462 (“From the birth of the administrative state, we have 
struggled to describe our regulatory government as the legitimate child of a constitutional 
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the discussion that follows, courts have sought to trade off some direct 
popular control for some effective governance, demanding frameworks 
promoting accountability to the legislature, the executive, and the 
people, along with the demonstrated exercise of instrumental 
knowledge by administrative agencies.  My goal here is to trace the 
broad structure of administrative law and frame it in a way that can 
provide guidance for the election law setting.  I therefore center my 
discussion on administrative law doctrines of governmental structure 
and rulemaking, as these best highlight the ways the federal courts have 
treated democratic values in this setting. 
The concern about discretion exercised by unelected administrative 
officials extends beyond courts.  Rachel Barkow has illustrated how the 
demise of ideas of mercy in criminal law traces to the development of 
the administrative state and anxieties about unaccountable discretion.122  
Likewise, the rise of cost–benefit analysis as a “technology of trust” 
speaks to the strong incentive to justify administrative decisions in 
objective terms.123  In these settings, concerns about discretion shape the 
nature and content of administrative decisions before they reach the 
courts (if they ever do).  Indeed, similar concerns about discretion and 
case-by-case decisionmaking have been advanced with regard to the 
courts themselves,124 and the longstanding rules–standards debate 
likewise rests in part on a divide over the propriety of administrative 
and judicial discretion.125 
 
democracy.”); Lindseth, supra note 105, at 645 (explaining that administrative rulemaking “is 
inescapably problematic from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy” both because 
“administrative agencies do not derive their power directly from a constitutional delegation of 
legislative authority from the people” and because “agencies do not depend directly on 
periodic popular approval—that is, they do not depend directly on the vote—for their 
continuing legitimacy”). 
122. See Barkow, supra note 121, at 1334–35. 
123. See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY 
IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 90 (1995) (arguing that “[r]igorous quantification is demanded 
in these contexts[, including cost–benefit analysis,] because subjective discretion has become 
suspect” and that “[m]echanical objectivity serves as an alternative to personal trust”). 
124. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “[t]here is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the extreme case, 
rather than adhering to the legal principle”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–79 (1989) (arguing that courts should adopt rules rather 
than follow a case-by-case approach). 
125. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992) (noting, in discussing the Court’s treatment of rules and 
standards, that “[r]ules, once formulated, afford decisionmakers less discretion than do 
standards”). 
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In response to such concerns about discretion and accountability, 
administrative law doctrine structures an elaborate model that 
legitimates administrative action through four means: (1) tracing agency 
action to a legislative directive (that is, explained in terms of a 
legislatively imposed principle); (2) subjecting the action to the 
oversight and accompanying democratic accountability of the executive 
branch; (3) reaching the decision pursuant to processes characterized by 
transparency, inclusion, and public responsiveness; and (4) defending 
agency action on the basis of demonstrated expert judgment.  The first 
three reflect a three-pronged model of democratic accountability, while 
the fourth promotes the ideal of effective governance.  Importantly, 
each of these doctrines reflects a balance between the demands of 
democracy and effective governance in a particular setting; as a result, 
each element is not only a component, but also itself a microcosm, of the 
larger administrative law model. 
Administrative law doctrine thus reflects a broad framework in 
which democratic accountability is promoted and departures from 
directly democratic procedures are justified to the extent that 
corresponding gains in effectiveness can be shown.126  In short, “[t]he 
task of administrative law is to generate institutional designs that 
appropriately balance the simultaneous demands of political 
responsiveness, efficient administration, and respect for legal rights.”127  
I focus here on the calibration of the first two of these, exploring the 
intricate trade-offs designed to maximize these two commitments, which 
can be in some tension.  As I suggest below, the variety of tools used to 
shore up the democratic legitimacy of administrative action may 
likewise provide guidance for debates about the legitimacy of political 
actors regulating the electoral process. 
 
126. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, 
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 399–408 
(2006) (discussing administrative accountability model and explaining that the model 
“regulates decisionmaking to promote rationality, responsiveness to public norms, and 
reviewability by others”). 
127. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1263–64 (2006); see also CHRISTOPHER F. 
EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 
3 (1990) (identifying three models of decisionmaking: “adjudicatory fairness, politics, and 
‘scientific’ expertise”). 
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1. Democratic Governance 
In significant part, administrative law doctrine seeks to ensure the 
democratic legitimacy of agency action by demanding multiple forms of 
attribution, accountability, oversight, and participation by elected 
representatives and the people themselves.  Here, I describe the ways 
the doctrine tracks agency action to the legislature, the executive, and 
the public.  This three-pronged framework appears almost Madisonian 
in the way it disperses powers, and includes an element of popular 
participation as well, which we might view as an acknowledgement of 
the democratic deficit that administrative law entails and as an attempt 
to bolster its legitimacy.128  I do not evaluate in this Article the precise 
balance between these three elements, or the different models of 
representation they allow for and create; rather, my goal is to highlight 
the development, through judicial elaboration of the Constitution and 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), of a doctrinal model designed to 
minimize the perceived democratic deficit in this setting. 
a.  Legislative Accountability 
Administrative law directs political decisions to democratically 
accountable actors through the nondelegation doctrine.  This doctrine, 
stemming from the vesting of the “Legislative Powers” in Congress by 
Article I of the Constitution,129 is commonly seen to be in a state of 
desuetude,130 as the Supreme Court has only used it to strike down two 
statutes (technically, two parts of the same statute) in its history, both in 
1935.131  Proponents of a robust doctrine see the limitation on delegation 
 
128. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING 
ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 214–30 (2002) (arguing for model of administrative rulemaking 
consistent with ideal of rule by the people). 
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives . . . .”). 
130. See, e.g., Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-)Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 588 
(2010) (remarking on “the nondelegation doctrine’s descent into desuetude in the area of 
administrative law”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A 
Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2000) (observing 
that “[s]ince the effective demise of the original nondelegation doctrine in 1935, the Court has 
searched for ways to assuage its abiding worry about broad delegations”). 
131. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–30 (1935); 
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air 
Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 332 (1999) (referring to 1935 as “the 
nondelegation doctrine’s only good year”). 
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as a means of protecting democratic ideals,132 in contrast to those who 
view delegation as necessary for effective governance or as more 
consistent with democratic values.133  On its terms, the doctrine requires 
that delegations to agencies be made pursuant to an “intelligible 
principle,”134 thereby denying the agency the authority to make 
fundamental political decisions itself.  In doing so, the doctrine formally 
distributes political authority to the legislature and limits agencies to 
instrumental decisions predicated on the legislatively provided principle. 
Though the Court has approved numerous delegations in which the 
intelligible principle is rather capacious (the FCC’s authority to regulate 
broadcasting “in the public interest” is one example135), the doctrine may 
still do some work in shaping agency action.  For example, while the 
Court has indicated that it will assess the presence of an intelligible 
principle based on its own reading of the statute, without regard to the 
agency’s explanation,136 the realities of litigation demand that the agency 
be able to argue to the Court in those terms, likely affecting the agency’s 
rulemaking practice.137  In doing so, the doctrine constructs a model of 
 
132. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the nondelegation doctrine 
“ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important 
choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most 
responsive to the popular will”); ELY, supra note 11, at 131–33; David Schoenbrod, 
Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 732 (1999) 
(discussing “the harm that delegation does to democracy”). 
133. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152–57 (1997) (noting that “it may make sense to imagine 
the delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the 
responsiveness of government to the desires of the general electorate”); Peter H. Schuck, 
Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 776 
(1999) (contending that “delegation—when backed (as it is in our system) by many powerful 
institutional and informal controls over agency discretion—constitutes one of the most 
salutary developments in the long struggle to instantiate the often competing values of 
democratic participation, political accountability, legal regularity, and administrative 
effectiveness”). 
134. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citing J.W. Hampton, 
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). 
135. See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 (citing this as example of broad delegation); 
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–27 (1943) (upholding this delegation 
against constitutional challenge). 
136. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472–73 (“Whether the statute delegates legislative power 
is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the 
answer.”). 
137. Professor Strauss advanced a similar argument prior to the American Trucking 
decision.  See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on 
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means-ends reasoning, distinguishing the principle that must be 
attributed to Congress from the agency’s authority to decide how to 
attain that goal.138  Notwithstanding the apparent impossibility of 
allocating decisions about ends to the legislature and ensuring the 
agency makes only means decisions,139 by demanding that divide and 
thereby requiring that administrative action be defended by the agency 
and approved by the courts on those terms, the nondelegation doctrine 
shapes a model of legislative accountability for the ends of agency 
actions. 
Scholars have explored the ways in which nondelegation ideals take 
shape in subconstitutional form.  Cass Sunstein argues that 
nondelegation values are furthered through canons of statutory 
construction,140 while Lisa Schultz Bressman explores the Court’s 
promotion of decisionmaking through the democratic process in 
performing the Chevron analysis.141  These discussions, and the Court’s 
decisions that underlie them, speak to the bluntness of the 
nondelegation doctrine as a tool for promoting democratic 
accountability to the legislature.  But the broader goal remains: through 
administrative law, courts seek to ensure that agency action is 
attributable to ends decisions made through the democratically 
accountable legislative process. 
b.  Executive Accountability 
The democratic underpinnings of administrative action are likewise 
supported by their connection to the democratic accountability of the 
executive.  In particular, the treatment of the appointment and removal 
powers shapes an administrative structure responsive to a popularly 
 
Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 442–43 (1989). 
138. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 982 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“The open-ended discretion to choose ends is the essence of legislative power; it is this 
power which Congress possesses but its agents necessarily lack and with which its agents 
could not be endowed by mere legislation.”). 
139. See RICHARDSON, supra note 128, at 116–18. 
140. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316–17 (2000); see 
also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 223–24 (criticizing this approach). 
141. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 
764 (2007); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 459–60 (2002) (arguing for the 
enforcement of values of the nondelegation doctrine through administrative law rather than 
constitutional law). 
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elected President.  In the appointments setting, Congress is denied the 
power to appoint administrative officials142 (though the Senate is given 
an advise-and-consent role143) in order to ensure a direct line of 
democratic accountability.144  The removal power, unaddressed by the 
constitutional text,145 presents a more complex framework.  While the 
Supreme Court originally indicated that the executive needed an 
exclusive removal power, even for the postmaster of Portland, 
Oregon,146 in order to ensure effective execution of the laws, it later 
approved “independent” agencies whose heads may be removed only 
for cause,147 limiting the President’s removal authority and, at least in an 
idealized way, the agency’s democratic responsiveness.148  This reasoning 
reflects a vision of effective administration: that some decisions, as 
specified by Congress, should be made apolitically.  The doctrine allows 
the President’s removal power to be limited but not transferred,149 an 
echo of the larger effort to balance democratic accountability and 
effective administration. 
Recently, a closely divided Court recalibrated this balance.  In Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
plaintiffs challenged the structure of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), an entity comprised of five members 
removable by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) only for 
cause.150  In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court struck down 
 
142. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127–28 (1976) (per curiam). 
143. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
144. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991) (“The Framers understood, 
however, that by limiting the appointment power, they could ensure that those who wielded it 
were accountable to political force and the will of the people.”). 
145. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is, of 
course, no provision in the Constitution stating who may remove executive officers, except 
the provisions for removal by impeachment.”). 
146. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926). 
147. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935). 
148. But see Strauss, supra note 14, at 596 (arguing that “any assumption that executive 
agencies and independent regulatory commissions differ significantly or systematically in 
function, internal or external procedures, or relationships with the rest of government is 
misplaced”). 
149. See id. at 614 (explaining that when Congress asserts a role in removal, “[i]t has not 
only limited the President’s ordinary political authority by imposing a ‘for cause’ requirement, 
but also greatly expanded its own political authority by insisting on a voice in that 
determination,” thus “defeat[ing] any claim that the measure has an apolitical end such as 
assuring objectivity”). 
150. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
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the for-cause limitation largely because it compromised the agency’s 
democratic accountability.  The Court noted that “[t]he diffusion of 
power carries with it a diffusion of accountability,”151 and that “[w]ithout 
a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot ‘determine on 
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of 
pernicious measures ought really to fall.’”152  The Court thus concluded 
that “[b]y granting the Board executive power without the Executive’s 
oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws 
are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment 
on his efforts.”153  In short, without the removal power, “the President 
could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own 
responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.”154  This framing is 
reminiscent of the Court’s decision in New York v. United States, in 
which the Court advanced a similar argument about the public’s 
inability to ensure democratic accountability where the federal 
government was seen to “commandeer” state government.155 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund strikes a different 
balance in seeking to promote effective governance.  He emphasizes 
that “to free a technical decisionmaker from the fear of removal without 
cause can similarly help create legitimacy with respect to that official’s 
regulatory actions by helping to insulate his technical decisions from 
nontechnical political pressure.”156  On this account, premised on the 
characterization of administrative responsibility as primarily 
“technical,” direct democratic accountability is not only unnecessary but 
potentially harmful, and it is abstention from political considerations 
that builds legitimacy.  This point is confirmed by Justice Breyer’s 
challenge that “in a world in which we count on the Federal 
Government to regulate matters as complex as, say, nuclear-power 
production, the Court’s assertion that we should simply learn to get by 
‘without being’ regulated ‘by experts’ is, at best, unrealistic—at worst, 
 
151. Id. at 3155. 
152. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 3164. 
155. 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (emphasizing that “where the Federal Government directs 
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, 
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the 
electoral ramifications of their decision”). 
156. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3169 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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dangerously so.”157  To the extent we view administrative action as 
primarily expertise-intensive decisions like nuclear-power production or 
auditing standards (and assuming we view even those settings as more 
expertise-intensive than values-reflecting158), it follows that the Court’s 
decision “will create an obstacle, indeed pose a serious threat, to the 
proper functioning of that workable Government that the Constitution 
seeks to create.”159  The Court’s contrary conclusion envisions agency 
activity as political and thus demands greater democratic oversight.160 
This divide between opposing accounts of the balance between 
democratic accountability and effective governance—in the Free 
Enterprise Fund opinions’ terms, between “democratic government”161 
and “workable government”162—presents the debate about 
administrative action in miniature: how do we balance political 
considerations, reflecting the will of the people, and the rule of experts, 
putatively independent of popular will, in governing?  The Free 
Enterprise Fund decision—and rhetoric—pushes this balance in the 
direction of popular accountability. 
This framework aligns with the model of administrative law shaped 
by the nondelegation doctrine, which likewise seeks to track political 
accounts of administrative action back to democratically accountable 
actors.  From a pro-delegation perspective, Jerry Mashaw argues that 
administrators should make political decisions “as a device for 
facilitating responsiveness to voter preferences expressed in presidential 
elections.”163  Then-Professor Elena Kagan’s argument that presidential 
involvement in agency decisionmaking should insulate against a 
challenge based on the nondelegation doctrine presents a similar 
account, premised on the increased accountability that presidential 
 
157. Id. at 3175 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 3156). 
158. See PORTER, supra note 123, at 51 (“We must be wary of dismissing [accounting] as 
routine and unoriginal.  The reputation of accounts and statistics for grayness helps to 
maintain their authority.  Considered as a social phenomenon, accounting is much more 
powerful and problematical than scholars and journalists generally realize.”). 
159. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3184 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 3156 (stating that the concern about popular control “is largely absent from 
the dissent’s paean to the administrative state”). 
161. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
162. Id. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the 
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers 
into a workable government.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court))). 
163. MASHAW, supra note 133, at 152. 
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involvement provides.164  Taken together, the nondelegation doctrine 
and the appointment and removal doctrines are complementary in 
preserving multiple sources of accountability, reflecting commitments to 
the selection of ends and oversight of the selection of means through 
elected officials. 
c.  Popular Accountability 
Administrative law does not rely solely on representative forms of 
democratic accountability to promote legitimacy, but on frameworks 
promoting popular accountability as well, most prominently through 
notice and comment procedures for administrative rulemaking.  These 
procedures, set out in the Administrative Procedure Act and further 
developed by the federal courts, promote public input and oversight 
over administrative action through publicity, disclosure, and 
responsiveness requirements.165  They thereby present a separate means 
of promoting democratic legitimacy, providing the public the 
opportunity and capacity to participate in the rulemaking process and to 
some extent dispelling the specter of secretive bureaucrats cooking up 
rules in their lair.166  Much as when balancing legislative or executive 
oversight with agency expertise, courts have sought in this setting as well 
to calibrate responsiveness with the demands of workable agency 
procedures. 
The notice and comment process comprises three primary elements.  
First, the agency must provide notice of the rule it seeks to enact,167 a 
publicity requirement for agency rulemaking, but one with some edge 
based on the judicial insistence that the ultimately enacted rule conform 
 
164. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2369. 
165. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (setting forth requirements for informal rulemaking). 
166. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992) (arguing that “although the Congress, the President, and 
the courts retain an important reviewing function, having administrative agencies set 
government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic republicanism’s call for 
deliberative decisionmaking informed by the values of the entire polity”).  Participation by 
nongovernmental actors takes other forms as well in the administrative setting.  See, e.g., Orly 
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) (discussing development of a “new 
governance model [that] supports the replacement of the New Deal’s hierarchy and control 
with a more participatory and collaborative model, in which government, industry, and 
society share responsibility for achieving policy goals”). 
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
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to the publicized rule.168  Second, the agency must supply the 
information relied upon in its development of the proposed rule.169  This 
serves as a disclosure requirement, on the theory that “[t]o suppress 
meaningful comment by failure to disclose the basic data relied upon is 
akin to rejecting comment altogether.”170  Consistent with this 
requirement, Peter Strauss has suggested that the provisions of the 
Freedom of Information Act,171 codified into the APA, help promote 
these disclosure interests as well.172  Finally, the agency must respond to 
relevant comments in the statement of basis and purpose that must 
accompany the final rule,173 a responsiveness requirement that ensures 
that the public’s input is not solicited and then ignored.174  Together, 
these requirements of publicity, disclosure, and responsiveness promote 
a more publicly responsive framework within the rulemaking process.175  
At the same time, the Supreme Court has limited the ability of courts to 
add additional procedural requirements wholly beyond those set out by 
 
168. See, e.g., Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(concluding that “if the final rule materially alters the issues involved in the rulemaking or . . . 
if the final rule ‘substantially departs from the terms or substance of the proposed rule,’ the 
notice is inadequate” (quoting Rowell v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 699, 702 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980))). 
169. See Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236–37 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It 
would appear to be a fairly obvious proposition that studies upon which an agency relies in 
promulgating a rule must be made available during the rulemaking in order to afford 
interested persons meaningful notice and an opportunity for comment.”). 
170. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977). 
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
172. See Peter L. Strauss, Statutes That Are Not Static—The Case of the APA, 14 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 767, 785–87, 796–98 (2005). 
173. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the 
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and 
purpose.”). 
174. See Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 252–53. 
175. For some concerns about notice and comment practice, see David J. Barron & 
Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 231–32 (noting 
that “[a]s practiced in the shadow of the courts, notice and comment often functions as 
charade”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 178 (1997) (arguing that “[a] 
threshold amount of participation is necessary to deliberative decisions, but at some point 
participation creates significant institutional costs for deliberative administrative process”); 
and Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 95, 96–97, 157–62 (2003) (criticizing APA model and advocating 
alternative based on instrumental rationality).  For discussion of the actual operation of the 
notice and comment process, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory 
Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414–16 (2005) (finding that the public does participate, 
in a somewhat useful and influential way, in the regulatory process, and suggesting 
improvements). 
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the legislature176 (or at least those arguably stemming from legislative 
directive), further calibrating the delicate balance between elected and 
non-elected actors. 
Political theorist Bryan Garsten has argued that “a chief purpose of 
representative government is to multiply and challenge governmental 
claims to represent the people,”177 an effort supported by the multiple 
lines of democratic accountability drawn by administrative law doctrine.  
These frameworks—tracing political decisions back to legislative 
delegation, ensuring oversight by the executive, and promoting popular 
input and oversight in rulemaking—combine and contend to advance 
democratic values within the administrative context.  Given the 
challenge of squaring decisions made by agency officials with the basic 
account of democracy, this mixture of procedural, substantive, and 
structural demands fosters the maximization of democratic ideals in this 
setting. 
2. Expert Governance 
Alongside these responses to democratic concerns, judicial review 
simultaneously serves to justify the delegation to the agency by ensuring 
that any democratic deficits are compensated for by the agency’s 
exercise of expert knowledge.  The basic question here is why agency 
action is permitted at all unless the agency is doing something that the 
legislature could not do itself.  Administrative law, largely through the 
“hard look” doctrine, strives to ensure that the agency take action on 
the basis of expertise and instrumental judgment, rather than for 
political or arbitrary reasons.  This doctrinal framework encompasses 
three elements: a requirement that the challenged action be defended 
on the basis on which it was originally promulgated; a heightened level 
of skepticism in review; and a demand for instrumental rather than 
political justification for agency action.  Together, these elements of 
judicial review shape the agency as an actor legitimated through its 
 
176. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 
524 (1978). 
177. Bryan Garsten, Representative Government and Popular Sovereignty, in POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION 91 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2009) (emphasis omitted); see also Bruce A. 
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1028 (1984) 
(arguing that, on the model of representation developed in The Federalist Papers, “the 
separation of powers operates as a complex machine which encourages each official to 
question the extent to which other constitutional officials are successfully representing the 
People’s true political wishes”). 
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exercise of expertise. 
In SEC v. Chenery Corp., the Supreme Court ruled that “an 
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which 
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its 
action can be sustained.”178  This rule limits the agency to defending the 
challenged action on the basis it relied on in enacting it, rather than any 
post hoc sources of support.  Kevin Stack has argued that the Chenery 
rule presents another face of the nondelegation doctrine, requiring the 
agency to connect its action back to the statutory delegation.179  By 
forcing the agency to supply and then rely upon reasons in reaching 
decisions, the Chenery doctrine structures the agency as an actor 
accountable not only on the basis of institutional legitimacy or 
procedural propriety but also on the basis of defensible reasons.  The 
doctrine further ensures that those reasons are not merely plausible, but 
actually reflect the originally stated basis for the action.  This 
combination promotes the democratic bona fides of the administrative 
system by ensuring that delegations can only be justified when the 
agency can defend its exercise of the delegated power with reference to 
the original delegation. 
Though the pre-APA form of review of administrative action was 
not very skeptical,180 courts now apply a more searching form of review 
under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.181  Judge Merrick 
Garland has observed that the Court’s decision in the State Farm case 
shaped a substantive hard look doctrine, in which judicial scrutiny 
exceeds that traditionally given legislative action.182  This trend has 
continued: as Gillian Metzger has noted, “It is generally accepted, at 
least by scholars, that ‘arbitrary and capricious’ review under State Farm 
is a far cry from the lenient scrutiny originally intended by the Congress 
that enacted the APA.”183  In short, not only the form of inquiry, but 
 
178. 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
179. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 
958, 992–1004 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he Chenery principle operates both to bolster the 
political accountability of the agency’s action and to prevent arbitrariness in the agency’s 
exercise of its discretion”). 
180. See, e.g., Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935). 
181. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
182. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 545–
49 (1985). 
183. Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 (2010). 
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also the level of deference given in pursuing that inquiry, differs from 
that given challenges to legislative action, indicating a model of 
compensating for democratic deficits by ensuring the effectiveness of 
administrative governance.184 
Most significantly for this discussion, the hard look model defines 
judicial review in terms of what the court requires the agency to 
demonstrate in order to defend the challenged action.  In the words of 
the State Farm Court, the agency action must be vacated if the agency  
 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before [it], or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise.185 
 
The agency is required to “examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.”186  In short, the courts 
“will take a hard look at the quality of the agency’s overall decision 
making”187 and will demand that the agency demonstrate the quality of 
its decision through reasoned explanation. 
This inquiry funnels political decisions to elected rather than 
administrative actors by denying the agency the ability to defend the 
challenged action on the basis of political considerations.188  While the 
Court has in some cases accommodated political decisions,189 it indicated 
 
184. Cf. Berger, supra note 89, at 5–9 (arguing that deference given to administrative 
agencies in constitutional cases should take into account the political and epistemic authority 
of the agency in that setting). 
185. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
186. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
187. Rubin, supra note 175, at 140. 
188. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 88 (“State Farm is expertise-forcing in the sense that the 
Court expects the agency to make discretionary policy decisions that can be justified by the 
relevant statutory factors, and not politics.”); Garland, supra note 182, at 542–49 (discussing 
State Farm holding). 
189. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(indicating that “[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to 
make such policy choices”); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of 
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in Massachusetts v. EPA that political considerations remain an 
insufficient basis for decision, concluding that the EPA had not 
adequately justified its approach to the regulation of greenhouse gasses 
under the statutory factors.190  In permitting the agency to invoke only 
instrumental considerations when defending an enacted rule, the 
arbitrary and capricious requirement channels agency justifications, in 
the words of Professors Freeman and Vermeule, “from politics to 
expertise.”191  Scholars have concluded from these and other recent cases 
that “hard look review prioritizes expertise and technocratic 
decisionmaking within the agency, in the process downplaying more raw 
political considerations,”192 and that these decisions are “expertise-
forcing” in their attempt “to ensure that agencies exercise expert 
judgment free from outside political pressures.”193 
In shaping this demanding oversight, hard look review of rulemaking 
serves to shore up democratic legitimacy by ensuring the agency’s 
exercise of expertise.  Professor Mashaw explains: 
 
 As Max Weber noted long ago, the legitimacy of 
bureaucratic action resides in its promise to exercise power on 
the basis of knowledge.  Administrative legitimacy flows 
primarily from a belief in the specialized knowledge that 
administrative decisionmakers can bring to bear on critical 
policy choices.  And the only evidence that this specialized 
knowledge has in fact been deployed lies in administrators’ 
explanations or reasons for their actions.194 
 
Here again, administrative law doctrine balances democratic and 
 
Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130–31 (2010) (discussing this issue and 
advocating greater transparency, including disclosure of executive influence); Kathryn A. 
Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 
(2009) (arguing for judicial acceptance of political considerations in reviewing agency action).  
190. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–34 (2007); Freeman & Vermeule, supra 
note 188, at 83–92 (advancing this reading of the case). 
191. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 188, at 51. 
192. Metzger, supra note 183, at 492; see also Watts, supra note 189, at 19 (“Ever since 
State Farm, courts engaging in arbitrary and capricious review routinely have demanded more 
than mere minimum rationality, and they have searched agency decisions to ensure they 
represent expert-driven, technocratic decisionmaking.”). 
193. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 188, at 52. 
194. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, 
and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 117 (2007) (footnote 
omitted). 
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expertise means of legitimation. 
Hard look review is not the only means of promoting an expertise-
based justification for agency action, as the structure of notice and 
comment rulemaking is likewise seen to play an epistemic role.  The 
Second Circuit has explained that “[w]hen the basis for a proposed rule 
is a scientific decision, the scientific material which is believed to 
support the rule should be exposed to the view of interested parties for 
their comment.  One cannot ask for comment on a scientific paper 
without allowing the participants to read the paper.”195  This account 
treats notice and comment procedures as a means of accessing the 
expertise of the public,196 and requires that the APA procedures be 
followed in such a way to best achieve such results.  Here too, 
administrative law doctrine promotes the maximization of exercised 
knowledge, shaping the trade-off between values of democracy and 
effective governance. 
We can read the Chevron doctrine to support this account as well.197  
Even if we call it “interpretation,”198 agencies do not approach statutory 
interpretation the same way courts do, but rather are filling in a 
statutory ambiguity using the tools and expertise in which they 
specialize.199  Agencies may be better seen to be engaging in 
specification, “a process whereby an end (or norm) is made more 
specific.”200  Put another way, on an ends-means framework, Congress 
must supply the end (pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine) and the 
agency must then determine the means (subject to hard look review).  
 
195. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977). 
196. For a fascinating account of this technique in classical Athens, see JOSIAH OBER, 
DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION AND LEARNING IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 
(2008). 
197. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
198. See id. at 844 (invoking the “principle of deference to administrative 
interpretations”). 
199. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative 
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 118 (2008) (noting “the particular forms of administrative 
decisionmaking through expertise, representation, and accountability—modes of inquiry 
inaccessible to judges”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory 
Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 519 (2005) (noting that 
“[i]f both agencies and courts are doing their proper interpretive jobs, it would appear that 
they should constantly disagree about interpretative method and, if method matters, about 
meaning”); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 309 
(2011) (arguing that “[c]hoosing interpretations from those allowed by a statute seem more 
akin to policymaking than to divinations of statutory meaning”). 
200. RICHARDSON, supra note 128, at 104. 
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Chevron speaks to the agency’s responsibility to “come up with more 
concrete and specific interpretations of th[o]se ends”201 in the context at 
issue.  The doctrine requires that the end the agency is specifying was 
actually left insufficiently concrete in the relevant setting (Step One) 
and that the agency properly perform the process of end-specifying, 
employing the required procedures and reaching a defensible result 
(Step Two).  Chevron thus calibrates the sites of democratic 
accountability by promoting specification in particular settings as an 
exercise calling for the type of judgment engaged in by agencies rather 
than that of courts, an approach based on responsiveness and expertise. 
The Mead doctrine further promotes the protection of popular 
democracy by providing that the presumptions underlying the Chevron 
doctrine apply only when Congress has delegated to the agency to act 
with the “force of law,” often through notice and comment 
rulemaking.202  In doing so, Mead dictates that agency specifications will 
be treated like means determinations only in the contexts most 
compatible with democratic forms of oversight.  Mead creates incentives 
for agencies to engage in decisionmaking through processes that 
promote public participation in order to obtain the higher level of 
deference for the eventual agency action.  While scholars have raised 
doubts as to whether the different frameworks of review yield different 
results in practice,203 the judicial structuring of the doctrine to promote 
democracy-enhancing practices reflects the commitment to legitimating 
agency action through democratic models. 
In requiring agencies to defend their actions on the basis of 
demonstrated rational judgment, while demanding politically 
accountable sources of delegation and oversight, and encouragement of 
and responsiveness to popular participation in promulgating rules, 
administrative law seeks to funnel political decisions to democratically 
accountable actors and expertise decisions to agencies.  Administrative 
law doctrine today thus reflects a blend of the three models identified by 
Richard Stewart, the “transmission belt” model, the “expertise” model, 
and the “interest representation” model.204  By simultaneously insisting 
 
201. Id. at 105. 
202. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
203. See, e.g., David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010) 
(concluding that “the ‘reasonable agency’ standard is, increasingly clearly, the standard that 
courts actually apply to all exercises of judicial review of administrative action, no matter 
what standard they purport to use”). 
204. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1671–88.  As an alternative approach integrating such 
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on adherence to legislatively dictated ends, accountability to the 
executive, effective popular participation, and the exercise of 
instrumental rationality as to means, the current framework of 
administrative law strives to ensure the legitimacy of agency action by 
mitigating some democratic deficits with effectiveness gains. 
This model—imperfectly realized, to be sure—presents a recognition 
of the benefits and dangers of agency action that is neither naïve nor 
cynical: allowing the state to take advantage of specialized knowledge 
while at the same time providing mechanisms of popular oversight and 
limits on both the scope and domain of administrative action.  More 
generally, this model of administrative law responds to basic challenges 
presented by democracy itself, seeking a balance between the demands 
of consent-based, autonomy-regarding democratic government and 
those of knowledge-driven, instrumentally effective, workable 
government. 
Administrative law reflects an attempt to embody and calibrate the 
virtues and limitations of democratic governance in one doctrinal 
setting.  In doing so, it serves as a useful model of a judicial response to 
a setting not characterized by the presumptively legitimate democratic 
ideal, presenting a developed structural framework for validating state 
action in the absence of such a presumption.  While mindful of concerns 
about the individual elements of the balance, I contend that the basic 
model distinguishing political or ends decisions from instrumental or 
means decisions and seeking to funnel the former to democratically 
accountable actors while subjecting the latter to procedures reflecting 
responsiveness to public input and requirements of exercised expertise 
presents a viable approach for translating democratic values into law.  I 
turn now to consider the possibility of employing the insights of the 
administrative law setting in the context of election law, another setting 
in which our democratic values run up against the realities of political 
governance. 
 
representative or expertise-based accounts, Evan Criddle has advanced a fiduciary model of 
administrative law.  See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular 
Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448 (2010) (arguing that 
administrative law should “safeguard popular sovereignty in agency rulemaking by adopting a 
fiduciary model of popular representation” (footnote omitted)); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary 
Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 163 (2006) (“While legal theorists 
have tended in the past to treat agency expertise, interest representation, and political 
accountability as competing approaches to the problem of agency discretion, the fiduciary 
model suggests that these elements should be integrated and coordinated to maximize agency 
fidelity.” (footnote omitted)). 
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IV.  CONNECTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ELECTION LAW 
Can administrative law provide useful guidance for election law?  Is 
the administrative law response to questions about democratic 
legitimacy relevant in approaching those that arise in election law 
contexts?  The fact that the concerns can be grouped under the same 
heading of course does not mean that they should be treated identically, 
and these settings undoubtedly present different variables regarding the 
role and capabilities of the federal courts.  I nonetheless contend that 
administrative law provides a useful model. 
My claim is that a central concern of administrative law—the need to 
ensure democratic legitimacy in the face of real-world governance by 
state actors without a reliably effective accountability mechanism—
mirrors that at issue in election law.  Further, I argue that the two 
contexts demand similar models of governmental decisionmaking in 
response.  Just as agency officials’ lack of direct accountability to the 
people yield administrative law requirements of reasoned decisions, the 
nature of election law as both necessary for and embedded within the 
democratic process likewise calls for demonstrations of both 
responsiveness and effectiveness.  However, despite recurring 
expressions of concern about self-serving regulation of the electoral 
process, courts have not developed an effective means of approaching 
this dynamic in the election law setting.  Administrative law, with a 
significant head start, has developed resources for confronting these 
issues, and there is much to gain by understanding and adapting that 
response. 
I begin this Part by examining two differences between 
administrative law and election law as a means of getting at the 
connections between these two settings.  These differences stem from 
the distinct institutional settings in which concerns about accountability 
emerge and the possibly varying role of the federal courts in responding 
to these concerns.  Establishing the precise ways in which administrative 
law and election law may be seen to diverge will shed light on the 
connections between them in terms of the concerns to which they 
respond and the forms of decisionmaking they demand, which I address 
in Part IV.B. 
A.  Differences 
1. Accountability Through Elections 
Though administrative law and election law both confront concerns 
of democratic legitimacy, the precise nature of those concerns is 
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somewhat different.  Administrative law addresses a structure external 
to a model of democratic legitimacy: the decisionmaker is unelected and 
therefore unaccountable.  We don’t need a robust account of democracy 
to understand this basic concern.  Election law, in contrast, confronts an 
internal challenge, where an elected actor faces doubts about his or her 
accountability based on some inadequacy of the election itself.  The 
difference is that between concerns about the identity of the 
decisionmaker and the nature of the decision. 
These two models could correspond to separate theoretical accounts 
and practical concerns.  We might believe that political actors are 
inherently more democratically accountable than administrative actors, 
even if elected from gerrymandered districts or with various distortions 
of the electoral process, because those distortions may operate at the 
margins, or may be of limited effect, and because, in extreme 
circumstances, they will not protect the incumbent against a militant 
electorate.205  Put simply, some election may be better than no election.  
In contrast, agency officials are not undermining the electoral process, 
but are acting outside that process altogether.  We can debate which is 
worse, at a principled or practical level, but the difference may counsel 
distinct tactics in response. 
On this point, consider two recent Supreme Court decisions decided 
with roughly identical lineups:206 the partisan gerrymandering claim in 
Vieth, and the separation of powers claim in Free Enterprise Fund, both 
discussed above.207  In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court ruled that the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was not 
sufficiently democratically accountable because its head could only be 
removed for cause by the SEC, whose own leadership could 
 
205. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“In this 
situation, as in others of like nature, appeal for relief does not belong here.  Appeal must be 
to an informed, civically militant electorate.  In a democratic society like ours, relief must 
come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people’s 
representatives.”). 
206. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas, with Justice 
Kennedy concurring in the judgment in a separate opinion that allowed for the possibility that 
judicially manageable standards might one day appear.  In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010), Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, 
joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. Justice 
Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter in dissent in the later case. 
207. See supra notes 25–26, 150–162 and accompanying text. 
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(presumably)208 only be removed for cause.209  Conversely, the Court 
concluded in Vieth that there were no judicially manageable standards 
for finding the partisan Pennsylvania Congressional districting scheme 
to be constitutionally problematic.210  In reality, however, the PCAOB 
may be more responsive to public will than the gerrymandered 
legislature,211 especially to the extent that the carefully constructed 
district lines dissuade any challenger from appearing and leave the 
incumbent unopposed.212  If so, what work is the idea of accountability 
doing here? 
The juxtaposition of these decisions suggests a view in which the 
existence of elections provides accountability, even if the nature of 
particular elections and administrative government makes that unlikely 
in the real world.  The question of democratic legitimacy then turns on 
what it means to be “accountable”—if all “accountable” means is that 
the people can conceivably vote you out of office, there is no tension 
here.  This discussion presents a question similar to the familiar 
formalist/functionalist divide in separation-of-powers law,213 here asking 
whether we simply ensure that there is an election in order to satisfy the 
concern for accountability or if we look behind the fact of the election to 
ensure the system’s actual capacity for accountability.  The difficulty the 
Court has had in dealing with elections takes the form of a refusal to 
pierce the veil of the election and assess its internal workings.214  Instead, 
 
208. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3182–83 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How can the Court simply assume without deciding that the 
SEC Commissioners themselves are removable only ‘for cause’? . . .  It is certainly not 
obvious that the SEC Commissioners enjoy ‘for cause’ protection.”). 
209. Id. at 3164. 
210. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305. 
211. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency 
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600–03 (2010) (discussing ways in which independent 
agencies are responsive to presidential preferences, focusing on contexts of financial policy). 
212. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Jonathan Nagler, Protected from Politics: 
Diminishing Margins of Electoral Competition in U.S. Congressional Elections, 68 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1121, 1125 (2007) (noting that “the effect of the [post-2000 Arkansas] redistricting was to 
put a number of districts sufficiently out of competition so as to dissuade any effort by the 
party out-of-power to even challenge the incumbent”). 
213. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism 
in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 29 (1998) (arguing that these 
models are interconnected); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to 
Separation of Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 
(1987) (discussing Court’s vacillating use of formal and functional approaches). 
214. See Richard H. Pildes, Formalism and Functionalism in the Constitutional Law of 
Politics, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2003) (“A significant problem in this body of law, in 
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the fact of elections is treated as ensuring sufficient accountability.215  On 
this view, elected actors are democratically accountable and non-elected 
actors are not.  The quality of the election is not an issue for the courts. 
But the mere existence of elections cannot be sufficient.216  We long 
ago moved from an era of popular acclamation to one of actual 
selection; democratic legitimacy nowadays demands a model of choice 
rather than simply consent.217  And courts have been willing to look at 
certain elements of the electoral process, as the doctrine has shown.218  
So it is not simply the presence of an election, but a broader judicial 
hesitance to get involved in the electoral process that is at issue here. 
The varying treatment of the administrative law and election law 
settings must be defended on some more comprehensive theory of what 
democratic commitments demand.  In particular, we should consider the 
ways in which the concepts of democratic accountability and 
responsiveness operate differently in the contexts of the operation of 
government and the selection of government.  While the need to ensure 
that administrative decisions are made subject to ideals of democratic 
accountability might require removal power in the President or a 
removable subordinate, and might demand a nondelegation doctrine, 
and so forth, elections might inherently possess enough possibility for 
accountability that there is less need for judicial monitoring.  Even if the 
theoretical commitments to democratic accountability are analogous, 
those commitments play out differently in the different institutional 
settings.  The concern for accountability does not vanish, but must take 
form in a manner fitted to the electoral setting. 
Ultimately, the administrative law and election law models present 
 
my view, is not that the Court has the wrong functional view of how democracy ought best be 
understood; it is that the Court refuses to approach these issues in functional terms at all.  
Instead, the law of democracy remains one of the last bastions of legal formalism in 
constitutional law.”). 
215. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), may serve as a useful example here.  See 
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 36, at 670–74 (describing how, through Hawaii’s ban on 
write-in ballots, a ban upheld by the Burdick Court, “a singularly powerful political party 
used its control over the state electoral machinery to devise rules of engagement that 
prevented internal defection”). 
216. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., More Democracy: The Direct Primary and 
Competition in U.S. Elections, 24 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 190, 190 (2010) (“Ever since the 
spread of democratic norms in the nineteenth century, autocratic regimes also have resorted 
to balloting to legitimize their rule, but only apologists endorse the results as ‘democratic.’”). 
217. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 197–99 
(1989) (discussing the move from acclamation to selection). 
218. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 46 and accompanying text. 
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varying manifestations of the same basic concern: that the 
decisionmaker is not sufficiently accountable through democratic 
processes and therefore need not be responsive to the public.219  This 
concern emerges straightforwardly in the administrative context, and 
the election law setting presents the same dynamic to the extent we 
recognize that our democratic demand is not for elections per se, but for 
elections that foster accountability and responsiveness.  The question 
reduces to how we attain this ideal in the electoral setting.  I return to 
this point after considering another institutional difference. 
2. Institutional Competence 
As an analogue to the claim that the demands of accountability play 
out differently in these settings, the institutional competence or 
legitimacy of the courts might likewise be seen to vary in the different 
contexts.  On this account, courts may either be better able to monitor 
administrative activity and deal with the democratic accountability 
concerns arising in that setting than to engage with election law disputes, 
or may act with more legitimacy in doing so.  Accordingly, even if the 
problems that arise are relevantly analogous, the courts can deal with 
them better in one setting than the other for practical or institutional 
reasons. 
This concern can take a variety of forms.  Administrative law claims 
regularly involve the Administrative Procedure Act,220 providing a 
statutory hook for decision, in contrast to election settings, which often 
raise constitutional claims.221  If courts tend to be more hesitant to 
intervene in constitutional settings, where their decisions are not subject 
to legislative overrule, than in statutory settings,222 administrative law 
may not provide a useful model.  Professor Metzger has suggested that 
the Supreme Court has recently enforced federalism constraints through 
frameworks of administrative law rather than constitutional 
 
219. See HERZOG, supra note 217, at 207 (arguing that “responsiveness can serve as the 
core of a theory of legitimacy, obligation, and disobedience” and that responsiveness “is also 
. . . at the core of the consent of the governed; it’s what people are most deeply gesturing 
toward when they invoke that phrase”); Charles, supra note 22, at 608 (“Under the standard 
democratic account, the democratic ideal is responsiveness.”). 
220. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006). 
221. Of course, many election claims are statutory—for example, those involving the 
Voting Rights Act—but those discussed in Part II rely largely on constitutional arguments. 
222. Cf. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513–17 (2009) 
(relying on questionable statutory construction to avoid deciding the constitutionality of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act). 
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adjudication,223 and a similar hesitance to directly engage constitutional 
issues may be at work in this setting.  The apparent shift in protecting 
nondelegation principles through administrative law rather than 
constitutional law speaks to this dynamic as well.224 
Likewise, election claims are unavoidably political, in multiple 
senses.  Decisions about the electoral process often present readily 
discernible partisan valences, the same effects (or their mirror images) 
that may be the motivation for the challenged provision in the first 
place, and courts may hesitate to play the role of anointer.  While 
judicial decisions in the administrative setting can have partisan effects, 
for example, if a particularly publicly salient regulation is struck down,225 
such decisions will rarely directly affect electoral outcomes.  In contrast, 
because challenges to electoral provisions are often advanced in the pre-
election period,226 the electoral effects may be particularly striking.  The 
very reasons for courts to skeptically review such provisions may then 
equally provide reasons to stay out of the dispute. 
A further difference may stem from remedial concerns.  Where the 
concern is that an unelected actor has exercised too much discretion, a 
solution is apparent: ensure that the agency decision can be attributed to 
an elected actor somewhere upstream.227  In contrast, if the issue is that 
the election itself is somehow flawed, the remedy may be more 
complicated, requiring the court to devise a change to the electoral 
process that would solve the problem.  Remedial ambivalence may be 
playing a role here as well. 
Finally, the target of inquiry in administrative law is often the agency 
rather than Congress or a state actor.228  For basic separation of powers 
and federalism reasons, federal courts may not only feel more 
comfortable taking on an agency, a fellow non-elected actor, but may be 
justified in doing so as a constitutional or theoretical matter because the 
 
223. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 
2023, 2027–28 (2008). 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 140–141. 
225. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007) (rejecting the Bush 
Administration’s approach to global warming regulation). 
226. See Zipkin, supra note 12, at 189 (discussing the pre-election posture of election 
claims). 
227. See Garland, supra note 182, at 586–90 (analyzing model of judicial review of 
agency action as focused on “fidelity” to Congressional intent). 
228. See Metzger, supra note 223, at 2054 (emphasizing relevance of the fact that 
“[u]nder an administrative law framework, the Court’s scrutiny targets not Congress but 
federal agencies”). 
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agency is not a legislature, without all that goes along with that status.229  
The lower bar for vacating agency action, perhaps connected to the 
courts’ knowledge of the ease with which a vacated action can be 
repromulgated, may funnel judicial action to that setting and counsel 
against it in the context of review of legislation.230 
In light of these factors, even if administrative law and election law 
present identical concerns and raise similar demands, these demands 
might still not be best enforced by courts, but left instead to the political 
branches to enforce themselves.231  Any approach modeled on the 
administrative framework must therefore be attentive to the particular 
considerations surrounding judicial review in the electoral setting. 
B.  Democratic Judgment 
Both election law and administrative law present the problem of a 
state actor who cannot be systematically trusted to act in the people’s 
interests because of the lack of an effective accountability mechanism.  
As a general matter, the legislature is presumed to be acting in the 
people’s interests and the fact of a party-line vote is legally irrelevant.  If 
the Democrats all vote for a tax increase and the Republicans all vote 
against, voters who feel strongly about the issue can express those views 
at the polls.  But when the PCAOB enacts a draconian auditing 
regulation, there is no effective electoral recourse, just as it is difficult to 
remove from office a legislator who draws the district lines to ensure 
that no challenger is willing to enter the race and thus runs unopposed.  
These settings leave tenuous the link between state action and 
accountability for that action. 
Crucially, the judicial response in the administrative law context is 
neither to reject administrative action as illegitimate nor to bless it 
following cursory review.  Instead, courts have crafted an elaborate 
framework, building on the Constitution and the APA, to balance and 
channel ideals of democracy and expertise, with the aim of developing a 
system sufficiently accountable and effective at governance to ensure 
 
229. Cf. Waldron, supra note 117, at 1353–54 (noting that his argument against judicial 
review only applies to review of legislative, rather than executive, actions). 
230. See Metzger, supra note 183, at 532–33 (discussing ways in which “[a]dministrative 
agencies . . . can respond to judicial reversal more easily than Congress”). 
231. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (developing an account 
of “judicially underenforced constitutional norms”). 
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legitimacy.232  In administrative law, concerns about democratic 
accountability are treated as entitled to a rigorous and full judicial 
response. 
The recognition that the commitment to democratic accountability 
can play out differently in the institutional setting of administrative 
action from the context of crafting election provisions calls attention to 
complex questions about the regulation of the democratic process.  How 
must decisions about the electoral process be made?  As discussed, in 
administrative law political decisions are disfavored and instrumentally 
rational decisions are required, as a means of overcoming the 
democratic deficit.233  We should likewise ask whether elected political 
actors can make decisions about the regulation of the electoral process 
on a political basis.  If so, self-dealing is to be expected and accepted.  In 
order to justify heightened judicial intervention, there must be some 
basis for holding decisionmakers to a particular standard beyond 
political will.  In terms of the differences described in the previous Part, 
questions about the judicial role are only relevant if we can identify a 
substantive, constitutionally enforceable ideal to which to hold political 
actors. 
In a recent article, Nadia Urbinati highlights the distinction between 
political judgment and judicial judgment.234  She explains that while 
“political judgment has generality (the general interest of the political 
community at large) as its criterion,” judicial judgment “aims instead at 
impartiality in evaluating a certain fact or a set of data or deeds.”235  This 
distinction, which takes form in administrative law as the Londoner/Bi-
metallic divide,236 sees the hallmark of legislation largely in its 
abstraction from the particulars of any individual.237  In contrast, the 
 
232. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487 (1989) (“But the Court’s long struggle to 
reconcile the growth of agencies with the Constitution yielded a solution far more complex 
than carte blanche for Congress to give agencies whatever power it wishes them to have.”). 
233. See supra Part III.B. 
234. See Nadia Urbinati, Unpolitical Democracy, 38 POL. THEORY 65, 81–85 (2010). 
235. Id. at 81. 
236. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915); 
Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 384–86 (1908). 
237. See Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335, 347 (2009) 
(arguing that “[w]hatever its relevance in other functions of government, the abstraction that 
representation involves is particularly appropriate for lawmaking, where what we are striving 
to produce are abstract norms—abstract in the sense of general—rather than directives 
focused on some particular person or situation”). 
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requirements of adjudication demand that the judge not consider her 
own interests in deciding the particular case on the basis of the law.238  
The legitimacy of each form of decisionmaking stems from these 
characteristics, with proper adjudication dependent on independence 
from the parties and with adherence only to the law, while legitimate 
legislative action depends not on the content of the laws (within the 
bounds imposed by constitutional rights) but on their having been 
produced through proper means, their general applicability, and their 
being subject to democratic revision.239 
Building on this framework, we can see administrative judgment to 
incorporate a third model, that of expertise or applied knowledge, with 
effectiveness, or instrumental rationality, as its primary criterion,240 a 
model consistent with the historical development of administrative law 
in America.241  While this account of administrative judgment will 
overlap with the judicial and legislative models, particularly insofar as 
the agency is engaged in rulemaking or adjudication processes, it is 
accompanied by the demand for instrumental judgment, distinguishing it 
both from the rule of law focus of the judiciary and the leeway given 
legislative actors to engage in political decisionmaking based on their 
democratic pedigree.  In short, as a state actor operating outside the 
scope of direct democratic authorization or the representational 
framework, agency decisions are held to a higher standard of rationality 
in judgment as a means of legitimation. 
The juxtaposition of these models presses the question of whether 
decisions about the electoral process are to be made by the legislature 
relative to its usual model of political judgment, or if the legislature is 
 
238. See Urbinati, supra note 234, at 81–82. 
239. Id. at 83–84 (indicating that “[t]he presumption of generality is essential to the 
moral legitimacy of political decisions” and that “[o]penness to revision, rather than the 
interruption or containment of democratic practices, is the democratic answer to 
unsatisfactory democratic decisions”). 
240. See Rubin, supra note 175, at 148–49 (noting that “according to Weber, 
instrumental rationality is the dominant principle of modern bureaucratic government”). 
241. See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence 
of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 406 (2007) (presenting historical 
argument that the New Deal gave rise to a “prescriptive vision of how public policy should be 
made” according to which “[t]he democratic process identified social problems at the most 
general level” and “[i]t was then the job of experts to discern the best way to solve a 
particular problem and implement the appropriate policy”); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 142–45 (1938) (arguing for deferential review of administrative 
action based on “the belief that the expertness of the administrative, if guarded by adequate 
procedures, can be trusted to determine these issues as capably as judges”). 
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held to a different standard of justification because of the tensions 
inherent in the electoral setting.  As discussed, election law doctrine 
presently reflects a political model of judgment, with allowance for the 
rule of law or judicial values implicated by voting rights commitments.242  
However, because of the character of provisions shaping the electoral 
process as both prior to and demanding of democratic resolution, I 
contend that democratic legitimacy demands something more than a 
purely political decision in this setting.  That something more is 
administrative judgment’s demand for instrumental rationality, 
reflecting a requirement that decisions about the electoral process be 
made on the basis of promoting an effective and legitimate electoral 
process rather than private interest.  My claim is that decisions about the 
electoral process call for the exercise of both political and administrative 
judgment—a sort of “democratic judgment”—even when made by the 
legislature. 
Professor Urbinati explains that the main legitimator of political 
judgment by legislators is the “openness to revision” of those 
judgments,243 an account she attributes to Mill and Tocqueville.244  This 
means of legitimation would require that the electoral process, as a 
precondition of representation and the exercise of political judgment, be 
structured to allow for such revision.  Consistent with this model, the 
demand for administrative judgment as to means serves both to further 
the attainment of the politically determined ideals of the democratic 
process and to ensure that the claimed ends are plausible and 
appropriate, and, in doing so, mitigates the threats posed to democratic 
values in these settings.  Effectively, the nature of the legislature’s 
decision as specifying procedures for its own election compromises 
presumptive legitimacy to the level enjoyed by administrative officials 
and calls for analogous justification in response. 
 
242. See supra Part II.A. 
243. Urbinati, supra note 234, at 84. 
244. Nadia Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation, 
28 POL. THEORY 758, 774 (2000) (“In his parliamentary speeches, Mill restated Tocqueville’s 
idea that while democracies are ‘perpetually making mistakes, they are perpetually correcting 
them too, and that the evil, such as it is, is far outweighed by the salutary effects of the 
general tendency of their legislation.’” (quoting John Stuart Mill, Representation of the 
People [2] (Apr. 13, 1866), in PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 66 (John M. Robson 
& Bruce L. Kinzer eds., 1988))); see also 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 231 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) (“The great privilege of the Americans does not 
consist in being more enlightened than other nations, but in being able to repair the faults 
they may commit.”). 
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The account I borrow from Professor Urbinati stems from her 
elucidation of a theory of representative democracy,245 but it is 
compatible with the demands of democracy on an array of procedural 
accounts, such as a minimalist competition model or more demanding 
representative or deliberative approaches.  On these accounts, the 
electoral process structures political decisionmaking, complicating any 
preference for political treatment of democracy itself.246  Likewise, on 
substantive accounts of democratic requirements that emphasize the 
outputs of the democratic process, decisions about the election process 
designed to further purposes at odds with those the people would 
choose or otherwise unexplainable on a public good account are 
similarly problematic. 
For these reasons, decisions about the electoral process shape a 
hybrid model, ensuring the generality and popular will reflection that is 
a hallmark of political decisions, while at the same time demanding the 
sort of disinterested judgment premised on effectiveness that would 
allow the continuing electoral process to function properly as a means of 
legitimating political action.  Adapting the administrative means-end 
model to review decisions made by a political actor in this setting can 
better ensure both sides of the political–instrumental commitment that 
foster a truly democratic electoral process. 
By invoking an ideal of instrumental effectiveness, I mean to set out 
a model of identifying an effective means of reaching the politically 
specified end through the application of practical knowledge.  This 
model, reminiscent of that described in the rights setting,247 but not 
dependent on the trigger created by a particular individual who can 
claim a severe burden,248 reflects the need to look behind the 
presumption of democratic legitimacy and to demonstrate the validity of 
the legislative decision more directly.249  Requiring evidence of 
 
245. See generally NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES 
AND GENEALOGY (2006) (developing a theoretical account of representative democracy). 
246. Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 52 (“Questions relating to boundaries and 
membership seem in an important sense prior to democratic decision making, yet 
paradoxically they cry out for democratic resolution.”). 
247. See supra Part III.A. 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 67–71. 
249. See Gunther, supra note 97, at 20–21 (suggesting a model of equal protection review 
that “would have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been 
formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends”); see 
also Garland, supra note 182, at 555 n.283 (observing that “the hard look is remarkably 
similar to the test Gunther proposed for application in constitutional review”). 
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instrumental rationality both avoids the circularity problem of decisions 
about the electoral process being made by actors elected via that process 
and justified with reference to that same process, and it simultaneously 
promotes the administration of a fair and efficient electoral system.  In 
short, for elections to serve as a democratically legitimate model of 
ensuring accountability, the elections must themselves be conducted on 
a democratically legitimate basis.250  Viewing regulation of the electoral 
process as not merely political but as instrumental as well will aid in 
attaining that goal. 
Though the question of whether this is the appropriate model for 
political actors to follow in enacting provisions governing the electoral 
process is distinct from the question whether the federal courts should 
enforce any such requirement, the argument developed here speaks to 
that point as well.  To the extent the primary argument about the proper 
model of decisionmaking in this setting is persuasive, it simultaneously 
calls for extra-political enforcement, as it is premised on not fully 
trusting political actors to make decisions governing the terms of their 
own elections.  This claim stems from ideals of both effectiveness and 
democratic legitimacy.  Whatever epistemic or institutional advantages 
the democratic process generally confers,251 those advantages are 
unlikely to be realized in the context of political regulation of the 
electoral process because the partisan or personal gains that certain 
procedures can be expected to yield threaten to swamp considerations 
based on expert knowledge directed to public ends.252  Further, to the 
 
250. See Charles, supra note 22, at 609 (noting that “in order for elections to fulfill their 
purpose in a polity, they must be meaningful,” in other words, “their processes must provide 
the opportunity for genuine contestation, and their outcomes must not be preordained by the 
design of institutional structures”). 
251. See John Ferejohn, The Lure of Large Numbers, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1969–70 
(2010) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE 
FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE (2009); and ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009)) (describing the “many-minds” 
arguments made by both authors, according to which “the popular branches may sometimes 
enjoy an informational advantage over the courts, insofar as they take account of the 
judgments of a wide range of people in making decisions; this advantage, other things being 
equal, may lead them to produce better decisions”). 
252. See id. at 1995 (explaining, in response to the “many-minds” arguments for judicial 
deference to the political branches, that “[t]o the extent that experts have different 
preferences than their nonexpert superiors, their bosses are less likely to accept their advice 
and the overall quality of decisions will be reduced”).  As Professors Levinson and Pildes 
highlight, the realities of partisan competition have undermined the Madisonian ideal of 
separation of powers as well.  See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of 
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006) (contending that “[t]he success of 
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extent we privilege decisions made by political actors over those by 
courts because of their democratic pedigree and so grant a broad 
presumption of constitutional validity, that presumption applies less 
strongly, if at all, in this setting because of the content of the decision as 
shaping the terms of election going forward.  As a result, despite the 
hesitations about judicial oversight described above, courts must play a 
role in this setting in holding political decisionmakers to the demands of 
democratic governance of the electoral process. 
As this suggests, the substantive framework of election regulation 
demands judicial oversight, not as an exclusive province of courts, but 
on a shared basis with political actors.  Much as the administrative law 
setting provides a framework of judicial review but with a general 
posture of deference as to substance, incorporating a means-ends model 
in the electoral setting would leave ends decisions to political actors 
operating within constitutional bounds while overseeing the exercise of 
instrumental rationality in effectuating the desired ends in practice.  
Such a model could limit the concerns about judicial competence in this 
setting, especially as to remedies, evaluating the actions taken by 
political actors on the familiar means-ends dimension rather than 
seeking some optimal model of democratic practice.  In short, the 
administrative law model of ensuring a democratic source for 
administrative action and allowing the tradeoff for the exercise of 
knowledge in effective governance presents a valuable paradigm for the 
electoral setting. 
V.  AN ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL FOR ELECTION LAW 
The complex and intricate approach to ensuring democratic 
legitimacy in the administrative law setting presents a model for a 
similar approach in the election law context.  I do not argue for the 
administrative law model to be transported intact to election law nor 
develop a full doctrinal account of an idealized approach to election 
cases.  Rather, I elaborate in this Part how the tools employed by the 
Court as a means of responding to these legitimacy concerns in one 
setting might provide guidance for a judicial response in the electoral 
context. 
 
American democracy overwhelmed the Madisonian conception of separation of powers 
almost from the outset,” and that “[a]s competition between the legislative and executive 
branches was displaced by competition between two major parties, the machine that was 
supposed to go of itself stopped running”). 
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The move I draw on in the administrative law context is the 
framework of means-ends reasoning and the funneling of ends, or 
political, decisions to democratically accountable actors, and ensuring 
that means, or instrumental, decisions are made on the basis of 
exercised expertise.  My focus is therefore on the combination of 
political and administrative judgment that broadly characterizes 
administrative law.  Before addressing the specifics, I will say a few 
things about this framework as a model. 
I recognize that the distinction between means and ends can be 
theoretically tenuous and difficult to fully specify in practice.253  It is 
nonetheless a useful construct in articulating the proper division of 
responsibility and authority between elected actors and agencies, as well 
as providing content for the idea of expertise.  Making decisions about 
the community’s values is what actors who are directly democratically 
accountable are tasked to do.254  In contrast, while such actors can of 
course make decisions as to how to attain those values and accomplish 
those ends, the model of delegating such decisions to those with 
technical expertise in the given context, while unavoidably “political” to 
some extent, is a coherent position, at least when suitably cabined and 
monitored.  Administrative law reflects this dynamic. 
Election law presents a contrast here.  In administrative law, the 
ends and means responsibilities are broadly divided between two actors, 
with one specializing in politics and the other in expertise.  A recurring 
claim in election law is that elected officials have greater expertise in 
politics and the administrative process than do judges.255  Whether or not 
 
253. See RICHARDSON, supra note 128, at 114–18 (describing the distinction as naïve). 
254. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 90–91 (1999) (discussing 
the model of the legislature as “the primary forum where our thinking and disagreement 
about justice takes place”). 
255. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“Where a legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for 
example, in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical 
legislative judgments—at least where that deference does not risk such constitutional evils as, 
say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge.”); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 261 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also have corruptive potential; but 
the Court strikes down the provision, strangely enough claiming more insight as to what may 
improperly influence candidates than is possessed by the majority of Congress that passed this 
bill and the President who signed it.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 324 (1962) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) (“Legislative responses throughout the country to the reapportionment 
demands of the 1960 Census have glaringly confirmed that these are not factors that lend 
themselves to evaluations of a nature that are the staple of judicial determinations or for 
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that is true, election law often leaves the legislature to play both roles in 
practice—the political actor on the one hand, and the expert on the 
other, and its work product can usefully be reviewed on that bifurcated 
basis. 
On the model proposed here, subject to substantive constitutional 
protections, the legislature can adopt the democratic value of its 
choosing.  However, the means of achieving that goal would not be 
subject to pure political discretion, but to a requirement of exercised 
instrumental judgment.  As I develop below, this requirement serves as 
a means of ensuring that the stated end is a plausible purpose and of 
protecting the effective operation of the democratic process by 
preserving the possibility of accountability. 
I describe here the broad outlines of how the administrative law 
framework might be adapted for use in the election law setting and 
sketch how the doctrine could apply in two controversial and 
complicated election law settings: challenges to voter identification 
provisions and to partisan districting schemes. 
A.  Adapting the Administrative Law Framework 
Adapting an administrative law model for use in the election law 
setting requires some changes, especially when the issue involves only 
one actor—the legislature as enactor of the challenged provision—
rather than multiple actors (e.g., the agency, Congress, the executive).  
The framework proposed here would apply whether the challenged 
action is promulgated by Congress, a state legislature, a state 
administrative official, or a local elections body.  Likewise, in light of the 
localized nature of American election governance,256 I do not distinguish 
in terms of framework of review between decisions made at the federal, 
state, or local levels. This approach is thus actor-indifferent across 
election settings. 
Adapting the administrative law model requires that we distinguish 
the ends and means of the challenged election provision and apply 
distinct forms of review to each.  The ends of the provision would be 
treated as political and granted the usual deference accorded the 
legislative process, subject to constitutional right to vote principles, such 
as the requirement that the only permitted ends are those internal to the 
 
which judges are equipped to adjudicate by legal training or experience or native wit.”). 
256. See Tokaji, The Future, supra note 29, at 130–31 (discussing “decentralization of 
election administration authority”). 
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election process,257 the demands of constitutional equality,258 and 
protections against severe burdens on voters.259  Where this framework 
has added bite is in the demand that there be a specified public-
regarding end and not merely incumbent protection or partisan gain.  To 
be sure, the Supreme Court has indicated that incumbent protection can 
be a “legitimate factor in districting,”260 and commentators have 
criticized this form of manipulation along with others discussed above.261  
The argument that incumbent protection is an inappropriate 
justification for a districting scheme follows from the basic argument 
here, that democratic legitimacy demands that decisions about the 
electoral process be made not on a purely political basis and that the 
process be open to revision.262 
Subjecting the government’s choice of means to a standard of 
exercised expertise or instrumental rationality would depart from 
Supreme Court decisions that provide that the state is not required to 
present evidence supporting its claimed purposes.263  As these holdings 
demonstrate, the current Burdick or Crawford sliding-scale model for 
evaluating right to vote claims is at heart a political rather than expertise 
model.  The approach advanced here would not necessarily bar the state 
from acting prophylactically or subject the state to rigorous evidentiary 
demands, but would merely require the State to show that the 
challenged provision is a rational means of achieving the specified end.  
 
257. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 299–300 (1975) (“The use of the franchise to compel 
compliance with other, independent state objectives is questionable in any context.”). 
258. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (finding a poll tax 
unconstitutional under Equal Protection clause). 
259. See supra note 66–67 and accompanying text. 
260. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440–41 (2006) (“The 
Court has noted that incumbency protection can be a legitimate factor in districting, but 
experience teaches that incumbency protection can take various forms, not all of them in the 
interests of the constituents.” (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983))). 
261. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 36, at 709–10 & n.274 (listing sources criticizing 
“self-serving manipulation of the rules of political engagement”). 
262. See supra Part IV.B. 
263. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997) (explaining 
that the Court does not “require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the 
State’s asserted justifications”); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 (1992) (noting that 
“this Court never has held a State ‘to the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective 
effects on political stability that [are] produced’ by the voting regulation in question” (quoting 
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986))); Munro, 479 U.S. at 195–96 
(concluding that “[l]egislatures  . . . should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in 
the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response is 
reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights”). 
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I turn now to describe how this approach might proceed in two 
prominent settings. 
B.  Voter Identification 
Consider voter identification provisions.  The Indiana law 
challenged in Crawford provides a useful example.264 This statute 
requires voters to display valid, government-issued photo identification 
before casting a ballot.265  The statute further provides that voters who 
cannot do so may cast a provisional ballot at the polls, which would be 
counted if the voter appears within ten days at a Board of Elections 
office either presenting such identification or executing an affidavit that 
she is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed.266  
The requirement does not apply to absentee ballots or to voters living 
and voting in nursing homes.267  This law is broadly similar to, though 
somewhat more stringent than, voter identification provisions enacted in 
other states.268 
The provision was justified on the basis of protecting the security of 
elections against voter fraud.  While this explanation is plausible at some 
level, we should consider what this requirement has the capacity to 
accomplish: it can only protect against the type of electoral fraud 
premised on not being able to show such identification at the polls.269  A 
model of review concerned with instrumental rationality will focus 
foremost on how well this means serves the relevant end. 
How would this review work?  Security of the electoral process 
against fraud is an undoubtedly legitimate end, as the Supreme Court 
has recognized,270 and one within the capacity of democratic actors to 
make as a political choice.  But, whereas under the Burdick framework 
 
264. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).  As noted above, the 
statute was enacted along party lines.  See id. at 203 (noting that “all of the Republicans in the 
General Assembly voted in favor of SEA 483 and the Democrats were unanimous in 
opposing it”). 
265. Id. at 185. 
266. Id. at 186. 
267. Id. at 185–86. 
268. Id. at 222 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that “Indiana’s photo identification 
requirement is one of the most restrictive in the country”). 
269. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 649–50 (2007) 
(noting that “[p]hoto-identification advocates also often cite irregularities that would not be 
prevented by a photo-identification requirement” and providing examples). 
270. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196 (“While the most effective method of preventing election 
fraud may well be debatable, the propriety of doing so is perfectly clear.”). 
10-ZIPKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:06 PM 
2011–2012] ADMINISTERING ELECTION LAW 703 
that would be the end of the analysis (unless the requirement 
constituted a severe burden), the model advanced here would go on to 
ask whether the challenged provision is an instrumentally rational 
means of achieving that end. 
The State may run into trouble here, insofar as there is no evidence 
of this type of fraud ever occurring in Indiana,271 much as Georgia was 
likewise unable to provide any such evidence in defending its voter 
identification provision.272  Indeed, the Supreme Court plurality 
upholding the voter identification law in Crawford was able to supply 
only two examples of such fraud: one nearly 150 years ago and the other 
involving a single fraudulent voter in the closely examined 2004 
Washington gubernatorial election.273  Under a hard look type of review 
like that set out in State Farm,274 the lack of evidence of such fraud 
simultaneously calls into question the legislature’s choice of means and 
the plausibility of the stated end.275 
Is it possible, as Judge Posner suggests in his opinion for the Seventh 
Circuit in Crawford, that this fraud is so difficult to detect that we could 
never determine its real extent and that the legislature must therefore 
act prophylactically?276  While it may be possible, this framing, which 
relies on a sort of variant of the precautionary principle, is at odds with 
Judge Posner’s claim in the same opinion that the instrumental value of 
the ballot to the individual citizen is effectively non-existent because one 
vote will almost never sway an election.277  If that is correct, there seems 
little reason to protect against the threat of someone risking a felony 
conviction to cast an extra ballot, a failure of rationality that would be 
caught by the proposed inquiry.  Perhaps more significantly, this 
argument presumes a contested value commitment about democracy, 
that preventing a fraudulent vote is worth deterring a legitimate voter, 
 
271. Id. at 194 (“The record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in 
Indiana at any time in its history.”). 
272. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(noting Georgia Secretary of State’s testimony on this point). 
273. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195 nn.11–12. 
274. See supra text accompanying notes 185–186. 
275. See Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 437 (noting that his 
suggested approach—for “closer scrutiny of decisions made by party-affiliated state or local 
election officials”—“might be analogized to ‘hard look’ review in administrative law”). 
276. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953–54 (7th Cir. 2007). 
277. Id. at 951 (arguing that “[t]he benefits of voting to the individual voter are elusive 
(a vote in a political election rarely has any instrumental value, since elections for political 
office at the state or federal level are never decided by just one vote)”). 
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the inverse of the criminal justice balance or a model of overprotection 
of rights more generally.278  Even if this balance reflects a permissible 
substantive decision under the right to vote, a difficult question I do not 
engage here, there is surely some upper bound on the striking of that 
balance, an assessment that an inquiry as to instrumental rationality 
would shed light on as well. 
Employing a means-ends analysis premised on instrumental 
rationality as to means thus raises hard questions as to why the 
requirement to show valid, government-issued photo identification at 
the polls was thought an effective way of preventing ballot fraud.  
Raising such questions does not answer them, as the ultimate outcome 
of the analysis will potentially vary depending on the extent to which 
voters lack identification, on the various exceptions or work-arounds 
provided, or on the efforts to expand the availability of identification 
attached to the requirement.  My aim here is to highlight the types of 
questions courts should be asking in these cases, focusing on the state 
action and whether it can be defended on political-instrumental terms 
rather than as a manipulation of the democratic process. 
C.  Districting 
Districting claims pose some intractable problems: On what criteria 
should district lines be drawn?  Which considerations are permissible 
and which not?  Can these decisions be made on political bases, or is 
there some objective apolitical means of drawing district lines?  These 
questions have long been debated, and numerous approaches have been 
advanced.  My purpose is not to reprise or survey the various proffered 
solutions but to sketch how the framework proposed here would apply 
in the districting setting. 
The Vieth decision highlights the difficulties inherent in approaching 
these claims, as it is predicated on the idea that even though partisan 
districting may be constitutionally problematic, there are no manageable 
standards by which courts can identify where the “too much” line is.279  
 
278. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1695–96, 1709 (2008) (using federal jury system in criminal cases as 
model of system designed to overprotect rights, and uneasily defending judicial review on that 
account). 
279. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (concluding that “no judicially 
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have 
emerged”).  This is Justice Scalia’s position on the nondelegation doctrine as well: the 
Constitution prohibits “too much” delegation, but the line at which a delegation is too much 
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And, despite valiant efforts to identify the point at which partisanship is 
too great,280 it is plausibly difficult to specify the border of 
constitutionality.  Some have tried to get around this hurdle with a 
“wherever the line is, this is clearly too much” framing, arguing, for 
example, for a rule against mid-decade redistricting.281  The 
administrative law model would avoid this issue, resting not on the 
competitiveness of the districts directly, but by focusing on the means-
ends relationship of the districting scheme. 
How would this work?  When faced with a challenge to a districting 
scheme, the court would evaluate whether the lines drawn reflect a 
viable instrumental means to a legitimate political end.  What counts as 
a legitimate political end?  The thrust of the argument here indicates 
that protecting incumbents would not be valid nor, correspondingly, 
would a goal of advancing the interests of one political party against the 
other.  So the defenders of the districting scheme would have to identify 
other values or interests the line-drawers sought to further, many or 
most of which would be legitimate political choices.282  The demand of 
 
is impossible for courts to identify and so the doctrine is unenforceable.  See Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “while the doctrine 
of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional 
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts” and that ultimately “the debate 
over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a 
question of degree”). 
280. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 335–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for application 
of standard from racial gerrymandering cases to partisan gerrymandering claims); id. at 346–
52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (advocating burden-shifting framework focused on unfairness of 
individual districts); id. at 361–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (developing standard targeted at the 
“democratic harm of unjustified entrenchment” based on “strong indicia of abuse”); Berman, 
supra note 22, at 838–44 (developing possible decision rule for partisan gerrymandering 
claims requiring showing “that the expected partisan value of the challenged scheme (to the 
party with majority control of the legislature) is more than x% greater than the expected 
partisan value of the redistricting scheme in the yth percentile of all maps generated in an 
appropriately pseudo-random fashion”). 
281. See Berman, supra note 22, at 845–52 (arguing that “[c]ourts should conclude that 
mid-decade redistrictings undertaken by a single-party-controlled state government are 
motivated by excessive partisanship—hence are unconstitutional—unless narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling interest”); Adam Cox, Commentary, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting 
Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 754–55 (2004) (arguing that “a procedural limitation on the 
frequency of redistricting that prohibits redistricting more than once each decennial cycle” 
would promote partisan fairness). 
282.  For an illustration of these challenging decisions, see Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. 
Supp. 119, 127 (W.D. La. 1994) (“The agricultural regions of District 4 include cotton, 
soybean, rice, sugar cane, and timber.  Such diverse agricultural constituency have few 
common interests.  We continue to question how one Congressional representative could 
adequately represent the varying interests of residents in such far-flung areas of the State.”). 
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instrumental rationality as to means would then serve as a way to ensure 
that the stated ends were actually furthered.  In short, a state defendant 
would not be able to defend a gerrymander designed to protect one 
political party by claiming that the scheme was drawn to ensure 
representation for communities of interest unless it in fact plausibly does 
so.  In this way, subjecting the state to this sort of means-ends analysis—
while ruling out partisan or incumbent-protecting manipulations as valid 
ends—can function as an alternative to the difficult line-drawing called 
forth by an approach premised on protecting against too much 
partisanship or too little competitiveness. 
Undoubtedly, the districting context is extraordinarily complicated, 
with a multitude of factors going into the placement of each line, 
combined with the requirements of compliance with the demands of one 
person–one vote, Shaw v. Reno, and the Voting Rights Act.283  
Nonetheless, in the face of continuing interest in the use of independent 
districting commissions, and given the Court’s indication that there is 
some constitutional concern underlying this area, a solution that leaves 
districting within the political process but cabins it with the demands of 
administrative rationality may present a desirable alternative. 
What do I expect to come of this framework?  Ideally, not very 
much.  One would hope that our representatives and election officials 
are already exercising reasoned judgment as to means of reaching 
public-regarding, constitutionally valid ends when regulating the 
electoral process, and I believe that they may often be doing so.  This 
approach would be relevant when they do not.  Indeed, I would not 
expect this model to significantly increase the volume of litigation in the 
federal courts, as any case where adopting this approach would affect 
the outcome is likely a case that already will come before the federal 
courts under existing doctrine. 
The administrative law doctrine developed over many years presents 
a considered and elaborate response to concerns about democratic 
legitimacy that has proven enforceable by courts and supportive of the 
legitimacy of state action.  In promoting political oversight of ends 
decisions and exercised rationality as to means, the doctrine combines 
effective governance with a democratic imprimatur.  Given the 
continuing concerns about self-dealing in the electoral process, the 
 
283. See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973j (2006); Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630, 649 (1993); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1983) (demanding exact 
equality between districts). 
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administrative law model presents an appealing and viable alternative 
approach. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the end, my framework reduces to something resembling a blend 
of intermediate scrutiny and arbitrary and capricious review; I consider 
this a virtue of the argument.  In pursuing this inquiry, my intention is to 
highlight resources for confronting these issues that have been 
developed by courts in a related setting and to urge courts to make use 
of those tools.  Much as psychological research shows that people find 
arguments more persuasive when they believe they are their own 
ideas,284 to the extent a promising approach to election claims has 
already been formulated and applied by courts in other contexts, that 
approach might find purchase in the election setting as well.  The Court 
has made clear its distaste for complicated rules in this setting,285 and has 
elsewhere demonstrated some comfort with “borrowing” frameworks 
from one context to another.286  If the concerns about responsiveness are 
clear in the operation of the government, they are equally salient in the 
formation of the government, and judicial monitoring provides one 
useful model of ensuring the commitments to popular selection and 
accountability that are the very purposes of elections.  Judicial oversight 
of this sort will not solve all the concerns in this area any more than it 
does in administrative law, but it would be a good start. 
 
284. See DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF IRRATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS 
OF DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND AT HOME 107–22 (2010) (describing the “Not-Invented-
Here bias” and “our tendency to overvalue what we create”); cf. INCEPTION (Warner Bros. 
2010) (suggesting the business value of convincing a competitor that an idea is his own). 
285. See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732 (“[A]ppellants argue that a maximum deviation 
of approximately 0.7% should be considered de minimis.  If we accept that argument, how are 
we to regard deviations of 0.8%, 0.95%, 1%, or 1.1%?”). 
286. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 459 (2010) (examining the practice of borrowing in constitutional law). 
